Tag: Republicans

Good and Bad Protests: It all comes down to free elections

In the realm of global politics, protests serve as a barometer of societal discontent, yet their legitimacy often hinges on the nature of the regime they challenge. Distinguishing between “good” and “bad” protesters requires an examination of context: are they rallying against an elected, representative government, or are they resisting tyrannical rule? This question came into sharp focus during the 2020 protests in Minneapolis, Minnesota, which erupted following the death of George Floyd in police custody on May 25, 2020. These demonstrations, part of the broader Black Lives Matter movement, quickly escalated into widespread unrest, including looting, arson, and clashes with law enforcement, resulting in an estimated $500 million in damages across the Twin Cities area.  In contrast, protests in countries like Venezuela, Hong Kong, and Iran have often been viewed through a different lens by the United States—supported as righteous uprisings against oppressive dictatorships. The key difference lies in the foundational principles of democracy, free will, and self-governance. Protests in the U.S. that aim to undermine policies enacted by a duly elected administration, such as those under President Donald Trump, border on sedition, while those abroad that seek to dismantle authoritarian structures align with American values of liberty and human rights. If we explore these distinctions, delving into historical and contemporary contexts, the role of money and culture in measuring societal value, the mechanics of representative republics versus mob rule, and the perils of communist influences attempting to exploit civil unrest for revolutionary ends.

To understand the Minneapolis protests, one must first grasp their origins and evolution. On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, a 46-year-old African American man, was arrested by Minneapolis police officers on suspicion of using a counterfeit $20 bill. During the arrest, Officer Derek Chauvin knelt on Floyd’s neck for over nine minutes, leading to his death, which was ruled a homicide.  Video footage of the incident, captured by bystanders, went viral, igniting outrage over police brutality and systemic racism. Protests began the next day, initially peaceful, with thousands gathering at the site of Floyd’s death on East 38th Street and Chicago Avenue.  However, by May 27, the demonstrations turned violent, with looting at stores like Target and Cub Foods, and arson setting fire to buildings along Lake Street, including the Third Precinct police station, which protesters overran and burned.  Over the following days, the unrest spread to Saint Paul and other cities, leading to 604 arrests, 164 arsons, and two deaths during the initial phase from May 26 to June 7.  The protests were characterized by demands for police reform, but they also included calls to defund or abolish police departments, which critics argued amounted to an assault on established law and order.

These events occurred against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s policies, particularly on immigration and law enforcement, which protesters often decried as oppressive. Trump’s approach emphasized strict border control, including the construction of a border wall and enhanced deportation efforts, aimed at enforcing existing laws passed by Congress.  In Minnesota, a state with significant immigrant communities, some protests intertwined racial justice with immigration issues, portraying federal policies as tools of suppression. Yet, from the perspective of election legitimacy, these protests challenged the outcomes of the 2016 election, where Trump was elected on a platform promising stronger law enforcement and border security. The 2020 election, which saw Trump lose amid widespread mail-in voting due to the COVID-19 pandemic, further fueled debates over electoral integrity. Claims of irregularities, such as unverified mail ballots and changes to voting rules by state officials without legislative approval, led to lawsuits and audits, though courts largely upheld the results.  Protesters in Minneapolis, by seeking to force policy changes through disruption rather than the ballot box, exemplified what some view as seditious behavior—actions that undermine a government chosen by the people.

Sedition, as defined in U.S. law under 18 U.S.C. § 2384, involves conspiring to overthrow or oppose by force the authority of the government or to prevent the execution of its laws.  Historically, sedition laws have been controversial, dating back to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which criminalized false statements against the government amid fears of French influence.  These acts were repealed, but similar provisions resurfaced in the Espionage Act of 1917 and its 1918 amendments, targeting anti-war speech during World War I.  In modern times, sedition charges are rare due to First Amendment protections, requiring speech to incite imminent lawless action per Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969).  However, the Minneapolis unrest, with its destruction of public property and calls to dismantle police forces enforcing federal and state laws, raised questions about whether such actions crossed into seditious territory. Critics argue that while peaceful protest is protected, violence aimed at policy overthrow bypasses democratic processes, echoing the point that these actions seek to subvert a government “picked by the people.”

Contrast this with protests in Venezuela, where demonstrators have long challenged the authoritarian regime of Nicolás Maduro. Since 2013, Venezuelans have protested against economic collapse, hyperinflation, shortages, and political repression under Maduro’s socialist government, which succeeded Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution.  Major waves occurred in 2014, following the attempted rape of a student and subsequent arrests, leading to 43 deaths and thousands of arrests.  In 2017, protests intensified over Maduro’s attempts to consolidate power, including dissolving the opposition-led National Assembly. By 2019, opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared himself interim president, sparking massive demonstrations against Maduro’s fraudulent re-election in 2018, where voter turnout was artificially inflated and opposition candidates were barred.  The U.S. supported these protests, recognizing Guaidó and imposing sanctions on Maduro’s regime to pressure for democratic restoration.  Unlike Minneapolis, these protests targeted a regime that suppressed elections, jailed opponents, and relied on violence to maintain control, aligning with U.S. interests in promoting self-governance.

Similarly, Hong Kong’s 2019 pro-democracy protests arose from opposition to an extradition bill that would allow transfers to mainland China, threatening the city’s autonomy under the “one country, two systems” framework established in 1997.  Beginning in March 2019, millions marched peacefully, but clashes with police escalated, involving tear gas, rubber bullets, and arrests.  Protesters demanded withdrawal of the bill, an inquiry into police brutality, and universal suffrage for legislative and chief executive elections.  The U.S. condemned China’s crackdown, passing the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in November 2019 to support protesters and sanction officials.  These actions were seen as resistance to communist encroachment by the Chinese Communist Party, which imposed a national security law in 2020, leading to mass arrests and the erosion of freedoms. 

In Iran, the 2022 protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody highlighted resistance to theocratic rule.  Amini, arrested for improper hijab, died on September 16, 2022, sparking nationwide demonstrations led by women removing veils and chanting “Woman, Life, Freedom.”  The regime responded with violence, killing at least 551 protesters, including 68 children, and arresting thousands.  The U.S. supported these protests by easing sanctions on technology to aid communication and condemning the repression.  Unlike U.S. protests, these aimed to dismantle a regime that denies free elections and enforces religious law through brutality.

The U.S. has historically backed such international protests as vehicles for promoting democracy and human rights.  In Venezuela, the Trump administration recognized Guaidó and imposed sanctions to isolate Maduro.  For Hong Kong, bipartisan legislation provided support against Chinese influence.  In Iran, statements and actions affirmed solidarity with protesters seeking freedom.  This aligns with America’s foundational values, where money measures initiative and ownership, fostering a culture of self-reliance and free will. In representative republics, citizens elect officials to enact policies, as in Trump’s immigration agenda, which prioritized enforcement to preserve national sovereignty.  Protests forcing change through violence confuse this with direct democracy, potentially leading to majority tyranny.

Election integrity is central to this distinction. The 2020 U.S. election faced scrutiny over mail-in ballots, with claims of fraud in swing states like Georgia and Pennsylvania.  Audits and lawsuits revealed serious issues.  In contrast, regimes like Maduro’s rig elections, justifying protests as the only recourse.  Elections are rigged in other countries, and its hard to admit that it has been happening in America.  Concern about “mail balls made up in a Walmart parking lot” echoes debates over ballot security, highlighting why preserving electoral processes is vital to prevent insurrection.

Underlying U.S. protests, is communist infiltration via progressive politics.  Historical fears, like McCarthyism in the 1950s, targeted alleged communist subversion.  Today, claims persist of cultural Marxism influencing movements like BLM, seen as platforms to usher in socialism by undermining capitalism and family structures.  In Minneapolis, some viewed protests as exploiting civil rights for communist ends, contrasting with genuine struggles abroad against actual communist dictators.

The difference boils down to intent and system: U.S. protests against elected policies risk sedition, while those abroad against tyranny merit support. Preserving free elections, resisting infiltration, and valuing self-governance ensure America’s republic endures, unlike faraway places lacking such freedoms.

Bibliography

1.  Wikipedia. “George Floyd protests in Minneapolis–Saint Paul.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Floyd_protests_in_Minneapolis%E2%80%93Saint_Paul

2.  The New York Times. “George Floyd Protests: A Timeline.” https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html

3.  CNN. “How George Floyd’s death reignited a movement.” https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/21/us/gallery/george-floyd-protests-2020-look-back

4.  Wikipedia. “Protests against Nicolás Maduro.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_against_Nicol%C3%A1s_Maduro

5.  Amnesty International. “Human rights in Venezuela.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/venezuela/report-venezuela

6.  Wikipedia. “2019–2020 Hong Kong protests.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%932020_Hong_Kong_protests

7.  Amnesty International. “Hong Kong’s protests explained.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/hong-kong-protests-explained

8.  Wikipedia. “Mahsa Amini protests.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahsa_Amini_protests

9.  House of Commons Library. “Two-year anniversary of the Mahsa Amini protests in Iran.” https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/two-year-anniversary-of-the-mahsa-amini-protests-in-iran

10.  U.S. Code. “18 USC Ch. 115: TREASON, SEDITION, AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.” https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&path=%2Fprelim%40title18%2Fpart1%2Fchapter115

11.  Cornell Law School. “Sedition.” https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sedition

12.  Wikipedia. “Attempts to overturn the 2020 United States presidential election.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attempts_to_overturn_the_2020_United_States_presidential_election

13.  Wikipedia. “McCarthyism.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCarthyism

14.  The Heritage Foundation. “The Secret Communist Movement Inside America.” https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/commentary/the-secret-communist-movement-inside-america

Footnotes

1.  For more on the economic impact of the Minneapolis riots, see the Property Claim Services report estimating damages at over $2 billion nationwide.

2.  The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on Iran documented extrajudicial executions during the 2022 protests.

3.  Historical sedition cases, like the Hollywood Ten, illustrate how fears of communism led to blacklisting in the 1950s.<|control12|>

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=20707

Why Islam is Growing: If Republicans want to win the Midterms–the psychology of winning

Republicans are cutting themselves short on the midterms playing on their back feet when in truth, they have won all the seats, and should use that to club the enemy over the head, the Democrats.  And people should not be fearful of Islam expansion, because there is a science to it that can be dealt with.  Don’t be afraid, learn to spike the football on the face of your enemy.  And be sure to call your enemy, the enemy.  Stop trying to make peace with everyone and be nice.  People don’t like nice, they like winners!  People don’t join groups, movements, or relationships because of policy white papers or perfectly calibrated moral sermons; they join because something in that collective—or person—promises to resolve anxiety and deliver victory. In eras of uncertainty, strength signals beat gentleness signals. Across political movements, religious sects, and even intimate relationships, the mechanism isn’t mystical. It is psychological. Decades of evidence show that when identity feels threatened or vague, people gravitate toward clarity, power, and “winners.” They seek what social psychologists call a reduction of self‑uncertainty through group identification. Groups that feel directive, morally certain, and combative—especially those with a strong leader—are unusually effective at providing that clarity. That dynamic is the heart of the appeal of aggressive movements, whether they’re framed as “revolutionary” or “restorative.” 123

The first mechanism is the quest for significance. Arie Kruglanski’s work shows that individuals who feel humiliated, overlooked, or stalled are primed to seek a pathway to mattering—status, honor, and belonging. When a narrative says, “You will be part of the team that wins,” and a network validates that promise, the psychological mixture becomes combustible; ordinary people can shift quickly from passive frustration to active militancy if militancy is framed as the quickest way to regain significance. In that sense, “victory marketing” isn’t crude; it’s efficient. It supplies a meaning‑laden road to restored pride and shared triumph. 45

Kruglanski’s “3Ns”—Needs, Narratives, and Networks—explain the stickiness. The Need is mattering; the Narrative names the enemy and sanctifies aggression as the efficient route to success; the Network rewards loyalists and shames doubters. A coalition that stops signaling decisive action and begins projecting compromise and perpetual process loses the Narrative’s punch and the Network’s reinforcement. Members then shop elsewhere for a more satisfying story that promises to end the anxiety and restore status. That is why movements that pivot from attack postures to “conciliation tours” often hemorrhage energy even if the conciliatory strategy is prudent. The psychology underneath doesn’t reward caution; it rewards visible strength coupled to a clear plan to win. 67

A second mechanism is uncertainty‑identity. Michael Hogg’s theory demonstrates that when life feels unpredictable and identity feels unstable, people prefer groups with sharp boundaries, simple norms, and strong leaders. These structures reduce cognitive noise. If the leader projects authority, punishes dissent, and speaks in unambiguous terms about enemies and goals, the group’s identity feels more protective. That dynamic pushes people toward “extreme” groups when uncertainty spikes, and it also raises the preference for authoritarian leadership styles over deliberative, pluralist ones. Strength performs an emotional function: it tells anxious people who they are and what tomorrow looks like. 13

There’s a third layer: mortality and threat management. Terror‑management theory finds that reminders of vulnerability and death (from pandemics to wars to rising crime) make people defend their cultural worldviews more fiercely and prefer charismatic, dominant leaders who promise safety and greatness. In plain speech: fear nudges voters and joiners toward coalitions that sound fearless. Combine existential fear with identity uncertainty, and the loudest actor who projects dominance gets disproportionate attention—even if their policy depth is thin. When the gentle coalition talks mostly about reconciliation, it can accidentally sound like it lacks the courage and teeth necessary to protect the group’s survival, and anxious members drift toward whoever sounds prepared to fight. 89

Once you see these mechanisms, the appeal of aggressive movements becomes less mysterious. Social identity theory long ago showed that people enhance self‑esteem by favoring their in‑group over out‑groups; minimally defined groups will still tilt benefits toward themselves and exaggerate the difference with outsiders. If a movement paints itself as the victorious in‑group—“the team that will win the season”—members will accept stricter norms and harsher rhetoric because those serve the higher good of restoring collective status. The social reward is belonging to the winning jersey. 1011

That’s why “strength signals” matter more than we admit. Populism research finds that the subset of supporters drawn to majoritarian dominance and rule‑bending “strongman” solutions isn’t driven primarily by anti‑elitism—it’s driven by authoritarian populist attitudes that equate decisive action with democracy and treat pluralist procedure as weakness. In multiple countries, support for strongmen tracks that authoritarian dimension, not the generic desire for change. If your coalition relies on being “reasonable,” it must still market victory—decisive goals achieved on tight timelines—and pair that with visible enforcement of norms; otherwise anxious supporters defect to a camp that promises a quicker, harder road to triumph. 1213

This dynamic isn’t limited to politics and broad movements. It appears right inside intimate relationships, especially abusive ones, where power and intermittent reinforcement create a paradoxical bond. Trauma‑bonding theory shows that when love and cruelty alternate unpredictably—affection after abuse, apology after rage—the victim’s attachment grows stronger, not weaker. The variable schedule of rewards keeps people “playing the slot machine,” hoping the good version returns, and the power imbalance cements the dependency. The abuser’s strength signal—decisive, dominating, controlling—reduces uncertainty even as it increases harm; the victim stays because the intermittent tenderness feels like proof that victory (a normal relationship) is just one more sacrifice away. That’s not a moral failing; it’s a learned behavioral trap proven to persist over time. 1415

Understanding that trap clarifies something about aggressive movements: they often combine harsh discipline with bursts of inclusion, celebration, and “love bombing.” The alternation is intoxicating. The movement frames devotion and sacrifice as steps toward the shared win—status restored, enemies humbled, order achieved. It’s the same cycle seen in abusive dyads but scaled to group psychology: tension, incident, reconciliation, calm; repeat. The unpredictability of reward strengthens loyalty, and the leader’s dominance minimizes the anxiety of choice. 1617

This lens also illuminates why some young people—including women—joined extremist projects like the Islamic State. Rigorous field interviews show a range of motives, but many revolve around significance, belonging, identity clarity, and a morally charged promise of victory against perceived humiliation. Researchers found Western women were attracted by roles in “state‑building,” the prospect of a clean slate, and a community with strict norms; women also became recruiters, using social media to broadcast the idealized version of purpose, honor, and victory. The ideology exploited the same psychology: a simple, rigid moral order, a strong, punitive leadership, a story of imminent triumph, and a network that validated sacrifice. That does not implicate all religious believers—most reject such extremism—but it shows how aggressive narratives can capture a subset seeking certainty and significance. 1819

Demography matters for how these perceptions play out. In the United States—and in large, culturally conservative states—Muslims remain a small share of adults, though they are growing modestly. For example, recent survey estimates suggest roughly 2% of adults in one large southern state identify as Muslim; nationally, Muslims remain a small minority, projected to grow but still far from majorities. That growth often triggers anxiety in groups that perceive status loss, which in turn increases receptivity to strength‑forward narratives. Responsible coalition‑building has to address the anxiety with facts and with visible competence—not with shame or soft language. People respond to leaders who demonstrate order and fairness, not just describe it. 2021

None of this means gentle leadership is doomed. It means gentle leadership must learn how to market victory and perform competence. Coalitions that want to hold members need three things: (1) a public scoreboard of wins, (2) an unapologetic enforcement of norms (consequence for defectors, gratitude for contributors), and (3) a narrative that places members inside a clear arc from struggle to triumph. That is exactly how the significance‑quest model works—and it can be used for good. If your coalition delivers visible wins and announces them like a championship season—“we hit the target, we corrected the failure, we defended someone who needed it”—the craving for strength is satisfied without sliding into cruelty. 45

The counterforce to aggressive movements is not moralizing; it is precision. Leaders can reduce uncertainty by setting unambiguous objectives, timelines, and roles, and then publishing weekly results. Hogg’s research implies that clarity plus boundary‑setting steals the psychological oxygen from extreme groups that promise certainty by punishing dissent. When members see that your coalition is a disciplined machine, the attraction to the noisy, punitive alternative declines. In practice, this looks like calendars, checklists, and a “no‑drift” culture—small wins stacked into momentum. That’s how you break the intermittent reinforcement cycle: replace unpredictability with reliable progress. 1

Finally, understand that collective narcissism—investing wounded self‑worth into a belief that the in‑group’s greatness is not appreciated—magnifies intergroup hostility. Movements that feed this sentiment will keep cohesion high by inventing provocations and promising cathartic revenge. Countering that requires two moves: regulate negative emotion inside the group (so grievances don’t become the group’s oxygen) and offer members a different path to significance—competence, craft, and contribution. When the pathway to mattering is building, not punishing, the coalition stabilizes around productive pride rather than fragile resentment. 2223

Put simply: people want to be on the team that wins. In periods of uncertainty and fear, they judge coalitions by how decisively they act, how tightly they enforce norms, and how clearly they promise victory. If the coalition sounds like a perpetual seminar—however noble its aims—its membership will drift toward movements that feel like a locker room right before a decisive game. “Strength sells” because it resolves anxiety, restores significance, and narrates a path to triumph. If you want to keep members, don’t just be right. Be strong, be clear, and keep score in public.  And if the Republican Party wants to win the midterms, stop playing on your back feet.  Attack the bad guys, make examples of them and show the world the path to being on the winning team.  And everything will work out just fine.

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(Further reading and footnote anchors)

• Quest for Significance & Radicalization: Overviews of how personal significance, violent narratives, and validating networks interact to produce recruitment and commitment. 45

• Uncertainty‑Identity & Authoritarian Leadership: Evidence that self‑uncertainty increases attraction to distinctive groups and strong, directive leaders. 12

• Terror‑Management & Leader Preference: Mortality salience strengthens worldview defense and support for charismatic, dominant leadership. 89

• Social Identity & In‑group Favoritism: Classic demonstrations (minimal group paradigm) of how group membership itself drives bias. 1011

• Collective Narcissism & Intergroup Hostility: How investing self‑worth in the in‑group’s image predicts aggression and conspiratorial thinking; interventions that reduce hostility. 2223

• Intermittent Reinforcement & Trauma Bonding: Empirical tests showing power imbalance + variable “good/bad” treatment strengthen attachment to abusers over time. 14

• Women & ISIS Recruitment: Data on female affiliates, motives (belonging, purpose, ideology), roles (recruiting, enforcement), and post‑territorial outcomes. 1918

• Religious demography (U.S. & Texas): Recent surveys placing Muslims as a small share nationally and ~2% in Texas; trends and projections to mid‑century. 2021

• Strongman appeal vs. anti‑establishment populism: Cross‑national evidence that authoritarian populist attitudes—not just anti‑elite sentiment—predict support for strong leaders. 12

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Footnotes

[^1]: Kruglanski et al., “The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism,” Political Psychology (2014). 4

[^2]: Kruglanski, Bélanger, & Gunaratna, The Three Pillars of Radicalization: Needs, Narratives, and Networks (2019). 5

[^3]: Hogg, “From Uncertainty to Extremism: Social Categorization and Identity Processes,” Current Directions in Psychological Science (2014). 3

[^4]: Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, “Thirty Years of Terror Management Theory,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (2015). 9

[^5]: Tajfel & Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” classic chapter (updated). 10

[^6]: Golec de Zavala et al., “Collective Narcissism: Political Consequences…,” Political Psychology (2019). 22

[^7]: Dutton & Painter, “Emotional Attachments in Abusive Relationships: A Test of Traumatic Bonding Theory,” Violence and Victims (1993). 14

[^8]: Cook & Vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State,” ICSR (2018). 19

[^9]: Hoyle, Bradford, & Frenett, “Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS,” ISD (2015). 18

[^10]: Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study—Texas profile (2023–24). 20

[^11]: Pew Research Center, “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050.” 21

[^12]: Brigevich & Wagner, “Anti‑establishment versus authoritarian populists and support for the strong(wo)man,” Frontiers in Political Science (2025). 12

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Bibliography

• Arie W. Kruglanski et al. “The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism.” Political Psychology (2014). START overview

• Arie W. Kruglanski, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Rohan Gunaratna. The Three Pillars of Radicalization: Needs, Narratives, and Networks. Oxford University Press (2019). Oxford Academic

• Michael A. Hogg. “From Uncertainty to Extremism.” Current Directions in Psychological Science (2014). PDF

• Michael A. Hogg & Janice Adelman. “Uncertainty–Identity Theory: Extreme Groups, Radical Behavior, and Authoritarian Leadership.” (2013). PDF

• Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg. “Thirty Years of Terror Management Theory.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (2015). Chapter PDF

• Henri Tajfel & John Turner. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.” (classic chapter). Text

• Agnieszka Golec de Zavala et al. “Collective Narcissism: Political Consequences…” Political Psychology (2019). Wiley

• Agnieszka Golec de Zavala. The Psychology of Collective Narcissism. Taylor & Francis/Open Access (2023). Open book

• Donald G. Dutton & Susan Painter. “Emotional Attachments in Abusive Relationships: A Test of Traumatic Bonding Theory.” Violence and Victims (1993). ResearchGate PDF

• Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford, Ross Frenett. Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS. ISD (2015). GIWPS resource

• Joana Cook & Gina Vale. From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’. ICSR/King’s College (2018). ICSR report

• Pew Research Center. Religious Landscape Study—Texas. (2023–24). State profile

• Pew Research Center. The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050. (2015; note 2025 update note). Report

• Anna Brigevich & Andrea Wagner. “Anti‑establishment versus authoritarian populists…” Frontiers in Political Science (2025). Article

• Aleksandar Matovski. “The ‘Strongman’ Electoral Authoritarian Appeal.” In Popular Dictatorships (Cambridge, 2021). Chapter

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=20707

No, I Don’t Cook: The state of marriage in the world

To answer the most asked question I get during the holidays, no, I don’t cook. My wife does. That’s not a joke, it’s a commitment we made in 1988 when we married young and chose a traditional family on purpose. I mow the grass, fix the cars, bring home the apples; she turns them into pie. That division of labor has kept our household steady for nearly four decades, and every year the same eyebrows go up from people who ask those kinds of questions—“You can’t say that.” Of course I can. We built our marriage like a small business with roles we both wanted, not roles assigned by a committee of strangers. And when someone tries to question our deal at the family gatherings over the years, I keep a poker face, and stay civil and nice—but I remember. My wife remembers too: I had an aunt once who took her to lunch to lecture her on feminism, the in-laws who offered social pressure in progressive wrapping paper, the yearly chorus of “help with the dishes or else.” We pushed back not to score points, but to defend something we knew was worth protecting.

What’s funny—what’s tragic, really—is how much social commentary people will smuggle into a question around stuffing and cranberry sauce. Behind the small talk lives a theory of marriage: some think roles should be erased; we think roles should be agreed upon. I believe in complementary strengths. And I don’t belittle the cook; I admire the work my wife does in our family, she is 100% committed in ways that are nearly gone these days. She’s made possible the work I do when most people are sleeping, because the clothes are clean, the house runs well, and a hot plate finds its way to my chair in the middle of the night. You want to know how I read so much, write so much, keep so many projects moving? It starts with the dinner that arrives without me asking.

Now, if we’re going to talk about how marriages actually fare, let’s invite the numbers into the room. The United States logged 2,041,926 marriages in 2023—about 6.1 per 1,000 people—and 672,502 divorces across 45 reporting states and D.C., roughly 2.4 per 1,000. That’s the official snapshot, and it tells you something simple: marriages rebounded from the pandemic dip, and divorces keep drifting down from their 1980s peak. 12 If you prefer measures that adjust for who’s actually at risk, Bowling Green State University’s National Center for Family & Marriage Research (NCFMR) puts the 2023 refined divorce rate at 14.4 divorces per 1,000 married women, slightly down from 2022; some analysts saw it nudge lower again in 2024. The refined marriage rate for women in 2023 held around 31.5 per 1,000 unmarried women. Translate that: fewer divorces relative to the number married, and a stable likelihood of marriage among those unmarried. 34

Of course, national averages flatten out the geography. In 2023, Utah had the highest refined marriage rate (49 marriages per 1,000 unmarried women), while Louisiana and Delaware were near the bottom; for divorce, Alaska had the highest rate and Vermont the lowest, with the U.S. at 14.4 overall. That’s culture, economics, and age composition all doing their dance. 43

And how long do marriages last? The federal government no longer publishes fine-grained duration tables the way it once did, but the NSFG’s event histories and Census reports paint enough of the outline: the median age at first marriage has climbed to historic highs—about 30.2 for men and 28.4 for women in 2023—meaning couples enter marriage later, after more schooling and work. Later marriages tend to be more stable than teen marriages, and the divorce hazards have shifted more toward economic stress and mismatched expectations than any single “traditional vs. egalitarian” switch. 56

If you step back and trace the arc since the mid-20th century, the significant facts are now old facts: we marry later, we marry less often, and divorce rates (by multiple measures) are lower than they were at their peak. OECD cross-national data puts the crude marriage rate for many wealthy countries between 3 and 5 per 1,000 today; the U.S. is higher than most at around 6, but it’s still far below the 1970s. Pandemic disruptions knocked weddings down in 2020, and they bounced back in 2021–2023. 78

The household story is equally stark: fewer than half of U.S. households today are married‑couple households. That was 78.8% after World War II; it’s been under half since 2010. Does that mean marriage is dead?  The cost of progressive lifestyles really starts to show here.  Our living arrangements have diversified, and a growing share of adults delay or forgo marriage—and often cohabit instead. 910 Pew’s longer view shows that most Americans now find cohabitation acceptable, even for couples who don’t plan to marry, though a majority still believes the country is better off if long-term couples eventually marry. Cohabitation has grown across age groups; by 2022, roughly 9% of Americans ages 18–64 were cohabiting at a point in time, up from 7.8% a decade earlier, with the highest shares in the late 20s. 1112

Does all that mean traditional marriage is disappearing? It’s more honest to say we’re in a sorting era. The median age at first marriage rose; remarriage fell; and the marriage share is increasingly concentrated among the college-educated and the religiously observant in certain regions. NCFMR shows the remarriage rate declining steadily since 2008—down to about 34.4 per 1,000 previously‑married men and 18.5 for women in 2023—suggesting fewer second chances through formal vows and more cohabitation after divorce. 13

And yet, under all the trends, the old expectations haven’t entirely vanished. A widely cited study in American Sociological Review found that in marriages formed after 1975, a husband’s lack of full-time employment predicts higher divorce risk, while a wife’s full-time employment does not—evidence that the breadwinner norm still carries weight even as homemaking expectations for wives have softened. 14 Another line of research argues that when partners’ gender norms clash—when the meaning of “husband” and “wife” isn’t mutually agreed—marriage becomes both more complicated to form and easier to break. That’s not ideology; it’s matching theory with real data on cohorts and states. 15

Once you admit the obvious—that marriage is a covenant built on agreements—my answer about holiday cooking stops sounding provocative and starts sounding like governance. The deal in our house is clear and cherished. We never outsourced it to a trend line or surrendered it to an aunt with a pamphlet. And when the holiday question lands, I hear the undertone: “Are you compliant with the new code?” No, we’re compliant with our vows. That choice has paid dividends in steadiness, in output, in the way we raise children and grandchildren, and yes, in sanity.

Around the globe, OECD figures show crude marriage rates clustered around the 4‑per‑1,000 mark with wide variance, and Our World in Data summarizes the broad pattern: most rich countries see later marriage, fewer marriages, and a decoupling of marriage from childbearing. In lower-income regions, median marriage ages are younger and formal rates are higher, but there’s intense regional variety, and progress on ending child marriage remains uneven and far too slow. 71617

Where does that leave the “traditional marriage comeback”? In the U.S., there’s no sudden surge in crude marriage rates; what we do see is a stabilization post-pandemic, a continued decline in divorce rates, and a concentration of marriage among those who treat it as a purposeful life strategy rather than an automatic milestone. Whether a couple chooses entirely traditional roles, fully egalitarian roles, or something bespoke for their house, the risk lies in misalignment—pressure from outside to reshape the inside. What saves a marriage is consented clarity. My wife and I made ours long ago, and we’ve maintained it against polite frowns and impolite lectures. I didn’t ask the world to bless that agreement, and I certainly didn’t give the world veto power over it. The results, measured by the calendar and the calm of a well-run home, speak for themselves.

So, no, I don’t cook at Christmas, Thanksgiving, or ever. She cooks, I carry the burdens outside the house, and the house hums. If the conversation at the table drifts toward social engineering, I smile and let the numbers do the talking: later marriages, fewer divorces, more cohabitation, fewer married‑couple households, and a stubborn breadwinner signal that hasn’t lost its force. You can read those trends as doom or as instruction; I read them as proof that the marriages that last are the ones grounded in agreed roles, mutual respect, and a united front against outside manipulation. That’s our holiday recipe. It’s kept us going for 37 winters, and it works.  And always remember, advice is only as good as the people giving it.  And most people aren’t qualified to give it.

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Notes & Sources (selected)

• U.S. marriages and divorces (2023): 2,041,926 marriages; 6.1 per 1,000 population; 672,502 divorces across 45 reporting states and D.C.; 2.4 per 1,000. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), NCHS FastStats & NVSS tables. 12

• Refined rates: NCFMR refined divorce rate ~14.4 (2023) and refined marriage rate ~31.5 (2023); state variation (Utah high marriage, Alaska high divorce). 34

• Median age at first marriage (U.S., 2023–2024): ~30.2 men, ~28.4 women; historical series since 1890. U.S. Census (MS‑2) and NCFMR profiles. 65

• Married‑couple household share under 50%; historical peak ~78.8% (1949). Census & USAFacts syntheses. 910

• Cohabitation attitudes and prevalence: Pew Research Center (2019) and NCFMR (2012–2022 CPS analysis). 1112

• Remarriage decline (2008–2023): NCFMR Family Profile on remarriage rates. 13

• Breadwinner signal & divorce risk: Alexandra Killewald, American Sociological Review (2016). 14

• Gender‑norm conflict and marital outcomes: Antman, Kalsi, Lee, Journal of Demographic Economics (2021). 15

• OECD cross‑national marriage/divorce comparisons & COVID disruption: OECD Family Database & documentation; Our World in Data. 78

• Global institution change overview: Our World in Data’s “Marriages and Divorces.” 16

• Child marriage progress & pace to elimination: UNICEF Data brief (2023). 17

—

Annotated Bibliography

• CDC/NCHS – FastStats: Marriage and Divorce. U.S. nationwide counts and crude rates for marriages and divorces; latest provisional (2023). Clear definitions and coverage notes about non-reporting states for divorce. 1

• CDC/NVSS – National Marriage & Divorce Rate Trends (2000–2023). Historical tables showing year-by-year changes in crude marriage and divorce rates, with footnotes on state coverage. 2

• NCFMR (Bowling Green State University) – Refined Marriage & Divorce Rates (2023). ACS-based indicators that adjust for the population at risk; state maps and margins of error. Essential for understanding geographic variation and trends beyond crude rates. 43

• U.S. Census – Historical Marital Status Tables (MS‑1 & MS‑2). Extended‑run time series on marital status and median age at first marriage. Useful for context on age trends and the shrinking share of married adults. 6

• USAFacts – “How has marriage in the US changed over time?” (2025). Synthesizes Census series into digestible charts on age at first marriage and household composition; suitable for communicating to general audiences. 10

• Pew Research Center – “Marriage and Cohabitation in the U.S.” (2019). Attitudes and experiences around living together; relationship satisfaction comparisons; long-term shifts in cohabitation acceptance. 11

• NCFMR – “A Decade of Change in Cohabitation Across Age Groups: 2012 & 2022” (2024). CPS-based point-in-time prevalence by age; growth concentrated in late‑20s cohorts. 12

• NCFMR – “Remarriage Rate, 2023” (2025). ACS event counts and rates documenting the decline of remarriage across sexes and ages. 13

• Killewald (2016) – “Money, Work, and Marital Stability” (ASR). Panel Study of Income Dynamics analysis distinguishing economic resources from role signals: the persistent effect of male full-time employment on stability. 14

• Antman, Kalsi, Lee (2021) – “Gender norm conflict and marital outcomes” (JDE). Theory and evidence on how norm mismatch reduces marriage formation and increases fragility. 15

• OECD Family Database – SF3.1 Marriage and Divorce Rates. International comparisons of crude rates, mean age at first marriage, and pandemic‑era disruptions; handy Excel annexes. 7

• Our World in Data – “Marriages and Divorces” & grapher for marriage rates. Broad global synthesis with interactive charts; connects U.S. trends to wider patterns. 168

• UNICEF Data – “Is an End to Child Marriage within Reach?” (2023). Global progress and uneven pace; regional concentration and projected timelines. 17

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=20707

There’s Not a Lot of Compassion for Rob Reiner: Hollywood has made itself the enemy of America

The December 2025 killings of filmmaker Rob Reiner and his wife, photographer and producer Michele Singer Reiner, and the subsequent charging of their son Nick Reiner, ignited polarized reactions across news and social platforms.   The recent tragedy has sparked intense debate—not only about the crime itself but about the cultural backdrop that shaped this family. Critics have noted that President Trump’s response lacked overt compassion, but this reaction must be understood in context. Rob Reiner was not just a filmmaker; he was a leading voice in Hollywood’s anti-Trump activism, often positioning himself against traditional American values. For years, Hollywood has distanced itself from the everyday realities of most Americans, creating a cultural divide that has eroded public sympathy for its employees.  Hollywood has made itself the enemy of traditional America, and in that regard, Rob Reiner was considered an immoral slob that nobody should feel sorry for. 

The contrast between Trump’s family values and Hollywood’s permissive lifestyle is stark. Trump famously raised his children with strict rules—no drugs, no drinking, no tattoos—reinforcing accountability and discipline. Hollywood, by contrast, often fosters environments where excess and indulgence are normalized. This permissiveness has consequences: many children of Hollywood figures struggle with addiction and instability. In Nick Reiner’s case, reports of substance abuse and personal turmoil underscore a broader pattern—liberal culture rarely emphasizes personal responsibility, and the fallout can be devastating.

Examples abound. From Sean “Diddy” Combs’ recent court revelations of grotesque excess to Charlie Sheen’s own admissions of destructive behavior, the Hollywood lifestyle often spirals into dysfunction. These stories are not isolated—they reflect an industry that glamorizes extremes while neglecting the foundations of family and morality. When tragedy strikes in such a context, the expectation of widespread public compassion becomes complicated. Americans increasingly view these outcomes as the predictable result of choices and values that run counter to the principles most families hold dear.

This is not about piling on during a tragedy; it is about recognizing the cultural divide. Rob Reiner championed a worldview that sought to undermine traditional norms, and the consequences of that worldview are now painfully evident. While no one justifies violence, the reality is that Hollywood’s broken culture produces broken lives. When those lives implode, the public’s reaction—muted sympathy at best—reflects a growing rejection of the values Hollywood promotes.

The timeline:

• Discovery and identification: On December 14, 2025, Los Angeles authorities found Rob Reiner (78) and Michele Singer Reiner (70) dead in their Brentwood home. The L.A. County Medical Examiner later listed the cause of death as “multiple sharp force injuries,” manner: homicide. 123

• Arrest and charges: Police arrested Nick Reiner (32) hours later, and he was charged with two counts of first-degree murder, with special‑circumstance allegations that could carry life without parole or the death penalty; he is being held without bail. 456

• Court appearances and schedule: Nick appeared in court on Dec. 17; his arraignment was set for Jan. 7, 2026, after his counsel waived speedy arraignment. 789

• Family statements: Siblings Jake and Romy Reiner issued a statement calling the loss “horrific and devastating” and asking for privacy and compassion. 710

Medical Examiner determinations and arrest/charging information are consistent across CBS News, Deadline, USA TODAY, and ABC reports. The dates (Dec. 14–17, 2025) and charging language (“first‑degree murder” with exceptional circumstances) appear verbatim or in close paraphrase across those outlets. 1254 

• In contrast, documented coverage after the killings focused on President Trump’s own posts, in which he mocked Reiner and attributed the deaths to “Trump Derangement Syndrome.” Mainstream outlets, not fabricated screenshots, reported these remarks. 1415

Snopes (Dec. 17 & 19) and Lead Stories (Dec. 17) show no record of Reiner endorsing political violence; USA TODAY and Axios document Trump’s remarks following the homicide. 1211131415

• Nick Reiner’s publicly discussed struggles with addiction date back to his teens, including multiple rehab stints, homelessness, and collaborative work with his father on Being Charlie (2015/16), a film loosely inspired by those experiences. 1617

• After the killings, reporting highlighted Nick’s longstanding challenges, with sources and past interviews noting volatility and non-linear recovery—common in chronic substance‑use disorders. None of these reports. 185

USA TODAY and PEOPLE provide direct quotations from earlier interviews/podcasts, situating addiction history in a verifiable record while avoiding speculative causation. 1617

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1. Celebrity activism and partisanship: Rob Reiner’s role as a high-profile critic of Trump and supporter of Democratic causes shaped how political audiences perceived him—before and after his death. 1415

2. Media dynamics: The Reiner case drew wall-to-wall coverage, but notable outlets also ran fact‑checks to counter false claims (e.g., fabricated posts, conspiracy theories about “secret tunnels”). The effect: a fractured information environment in which audiences pick narratives that fit their priors. 20

USA TODAY/Axios frames Reiner’s political profile; Snopes/AFP/AllSides documents rumor‑correction cycles that coexist with breaking news coverage. 1415111920

• Responsible inferences: It is fair to conclude that political identity and celebrity status influence public reaction, that false quotes altered perceptions of Reiner’s character, and that addiction history was part of Nick’s public narrative before 2025.  Those quotes that were attributed to Reiner were in the spirit of the way he projected himself, leading people to draw their own conclusions past the clean public relations efforts that actors often use to hide their true feelings which they utter to other people in private. 121417

• Where we should not refrain: this family’s tragedy is a sweeping indictment of entire political or cultural communities in regard to Hollywood as a culture.  And we must make claims of definitive causation without court findings because the courts as we have seen recently no longer represent the kind of justice Americans expect, and we don’t have time to wait on them. Nick Reiner’s case is ongoing; presumption of innocence applies even as the blood drips from the weapons he used to conduct the killings. 5

While in the past a story like this might have sparked weeks of discussion and reflection on Rob Reiner’s life, as an artist most people knew something about.  But in the wake of his political statements and his attempts to steer people away from supporting Trump, he has essentially angered most of the country.  And when something bad happens in Hollywood culture now, people have much less compassion and are ready to move on from the story much more quickly.  Forgiveness of these terrible Hollywood families and the lifestyles they live, and produce children out of, is not on the table any longer.  And Trump represents that evolution in his comments after the murders.  Because it’s not Trump that leads the nation, it’s Trump who is a creation of that nation and their sentiments.  And Hollywood, clearly, didn’t respect that process, and they took advantage of the power they did have within the entertainment desires of American culture.

Footnotes

1. L.A. County Medical Examiner cause of death: “multiple sharp force injuries,” homicide; Dec. 17, 2025. 12

2. LAPD and DA timeline; arrest, charges, special‑circumstance allegations. 45

3. Court appearance and arraignment scheduling. 78

4. Family statements requesting compassion and privacy. 710

5. Debunked quotes attributed to Reiner about the Trump shooting attempt. 1112

6. Documented coverage of President Trump’s remarks after Reiner’s death. 1415

7. Nick Reiner’s publicly discussed addiction history; Being Charlie context. 1716

8. Rumor‑correction cycle (fabricated posts; conspiracy content). 1920

—

Bibliography & Further Reading

• CBS News — “L.A. County medical examiner releases Rob and Michele Reiner’s causes of death.” Link

• Deadline — “Rob Reiner’s Official Cause Of Death Revealed By LA Medical Examiner.” Link

• ABC News — “Rob Reiner’s son, Nick Reiner, charged with 1st‑degree murder with special circumstances.” Link

• USA TODAY — “Rob Reiner’s son Nick charged with murder in parents’ deaths.” Link

• CBS News — “Nick Reiner, Rob and Michele Reiner’s son, appears in court; arraignment set for Jan. 7.” Link

• Snopes — “Rumor claiming Rob Reiner said he wished would‑be Trump assassin ‘hadn’t missed’ is unfounded.” Link

• Snopes — “Did Rob Reiner say ‘too bad he turned his head’ about Trump assassination attempt? There’s no proof.” Link

• USA TODAY — “What did Rob Reiner say about Trump? POTUS called it ‘derangement.” Link

• Axios — “Trump mocks Rob Reiner after death. Here’s what Reiner said about Trump and Charlie Kirk.” Link

• PEOPLE — “Rob Reiner’s Son Nick Previously Spoke About His Struggles with Drug Addiction and Homelessness.” Link

• USA TODAY — “Rob Reiner’s son Nick once ‘wrecked’ his parents’ guest house” (podcast recollections). Link

• AllSides (Snopes reprint) — “False claim of secret tunnels beneath Rob Reiner’s home spreads online.”

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=2070

The Cause of the Affordability Crisis: Managed economies and political interventions have destroyed cost structures

The truth about affordability, because that’s the tired drumbeat the Left will pound all the way into 2026: “prices are high, blame the billionaire.” It’s the same old class-war script—paint the rich guy as out of touch, pretend the pain at the pump and the grocery store fell from the sky, and hope voters forget who built the scaffolding for that pain. The truth is, affordability has roots—deep, structural roots—in policy choices that take years to unwind. Unwinding is slow; rebuilding competitive markets is slower; letting innovation breathe is slower still. But it happens. And when it happens—especially around energy and health care—you feel it first in the path of prices, then in the path of opportunity. That’s the meat and potatoes of the issue that everyone needs to understand as we go forward.

Starting with health care because it’s so grotesquely obvious—the Democrats’ favorite talking point and, paradoxically, their favorite controlled market. What the public senses as “expensive care” is really an industry whose cost structure is defended by regulation, protected monopolies, and financial engineering that prioritizes jobs and margin over cures. Just look at the macro: national health expenditures reached roughly $4.9 trillion in 2023—17.6% of GDP—and blew past $5 trillion in 2024, with CMS projecting the health share of the economy could hit 20.3% by 2033. That’s not me speculating; it’s the official actuaries. They estimate spending growth of 8.2% in 2024 and 7.1% in 2025—outpacing GDP—driven by rising utilization and coverage levels. 1234 You don’t need a PhD in economics to hear what that says: health care, as currently constituted, is set on an upward cost glide path that eats the economy.

Dig beneath the top line, and you find what patients feel: hospitals posted double-digit spending growth in 2023; physician services accelerated; prescription drugs jumped more than 11% in 2023 alone. 1 These are not isolated blips—they’re part of a financing machine that has learned to monetize chronic decline. It’s the difference between maintaining weakness for revenue and making patients truly well, which would shrink the revenue base. That philosophical choice drives both policy and practice.

Layer in the private‑equity wave. In health care, PE ownership has expanded rapidly across hospitals, specialty practices, nursing homes, and ancillaries. Systematic reviews in BMJ and updates from Wharton’s HMPI synthesize dozens of empirical studies and repeatedly find what clinicians and patients suspect: PE ownership is most consistently associated with higher costs to patients or payers and mixed-to-harmful impacts on quality. Staffing skews downward, administrative pressure increases, and the exit horizon is 3–7 years, with debt piled onto the acquired entity. 56 Even JAMA’s coverage of the evidence lands in the same place: higher costs, quality concerns. 7 Now, to be fair, not every PE hospital outcome is catastrophic; a late‑2025 research brief found no excess closures and cost-cutting concentrated in admin rather than core medicine, though patient satisfaction dipped. 8 But the through‑line is unmistakable: financialization has bridged into care delivery, and the pass-through is inflationary for payers and patients. When you lace debt service, management fees, and rapid roll-up incentives on top of already rising unit costs, affordability dies by a thousand cuts.

And we haven’t even touched the bigger affordability architecture—consolidation and financialization across supply chains. Ten years ago, lean shops squeezed costs by owning their processes and competing in open markets. Today, in many sectors—manufacturing, food processing, distribution—the playbook is add-on acquisitions, platform roll-ups, and fee-driven intermediaries. Private equity has poured roughly $262 billion into U.S. manufacturing firms since 2020, explicitly to consolidate and “unlock value at speed,” while debt financing has been layered into an already fragile logistics environment. 910 The National Economic Council’s 2021–2024 Quadrennial Supply Chain Review lays it out in sober terms: critical chains—from energy components to pharmaceuticals and agri‑food—were brittle, policy‑distorted, and subject to non-market practices that amplified shocks. 11

Why should voters care about that alphabet soup of capital and supply chain policy? Because the price on your shelf has a genealogy. COVID made that visible; economists at Brookings argue that the inflation shock was largely supply-driven, with long lags as delivery times normalized and margins reset—proving that what breaks upstream ripples downstream for years. 12 The Richmond Fed estimates that about half of a disruption’s total effect comes from amplification through the supply network; shocks abroad propagate into U.S. GDP and inflation, and re-shoring, redundancy, and inventory carry real cost. 13 Translation: if you replace diversified mom‑and‑pop networks with concentrated platforms, then hit those platforms with a once-in-a-century shock and policy friction, you get sticker shock that doesn’t vanish overnight.

Then there are the minimum wage mandates, which I warned about a decade ago when Democrats pushed for them and which, mainly, got what they wanted during Covid—the bottom-up piece of the affordability puzzle. The Left sells them as “free money,” then acts surprised when menus and price tags jump. The CPI tells a straightforward story: food away from home rose 3.6% in 2024, outpacing grocery inflation, and industry groups show menu prices still rising into late 2025. 1415 CNBC put a fine point on limited-service meals: almost 28% price growth from 2019 to 2023—well above the overall CPI—driven in part by labor cost increases that chains passed on to customers, especially in high-mandate states. 16 The academic literature fills in the mechanism. Recent meta-analysis estimates a 0.03–0.11 price elasticity to minimum wage changes—meaning a 10% hike produces roughly 0.3–1.1% price increases, bigger in labor-intensive sectors like restaurants. 17 NBER and Upjohn surveys show mixed employment effects but clear evidence of slower job growth and hours adjustments over time, with price pass-through in narrow industries. 1819 And when wage floors leap in gig delivery, the “unintended consequences” are no longer theoretical; a 2025 NBER working paper tracking Seattle’s 2024 ordinance found base pay doubled per task, but tips and order volume fell, netting out the gains for most active drivers within a month while delivery costs popped and idle time rose. 20 All that flows straight into the affordability experience at the counter. If your value meal used to be $5 and now feels like $10, it’s not imaginary—the chain is absorbing higher mandated labor costs, higher input volatility, and a consolidated middleman layer that taxes every step. The macro data confirm the sting: food prices rose 2.5% overall in 2024, but restaurant inflation was higher, and eggs, beef, and insurance were outliers. 14

The other pillar in the affordability conversation is energy—because it feeds trucks, ships, harvesters, ovens, and heat. Here’s some good news: U.S. oil production set records through 2024 and 2025, with the EIA projecting record crude and gas output in 2025, and AAA reports December 2025 gasoline averages around $2.89 nationally—the cheapest December since 2020. That’s not partisan; that’s a supply reality. 212223 The EIA’s Short‑Term Energy Outlook expects Brent to settle near $55/bbl through 2026 as inventories rise, while dry gas production continues climbing. 24 In plain English: drilling and efficiency gains—especially in the Permian—have kept domestic supply high and prices stable, muting one of the biggest drivers of household pain. 25 So when we say a pro‑production posture affects affordability, this is the line we draw: more barrels and cubic feet, fewer spikes at the pump, cheaper freight, easier input cost for food and goods.

Affordability isn’t “high versus low prices in a vacuum.” It’s the architecture of how costs stack up: energy feeds logistics; logistics feed input prices; input prices feed menus and store shelves; health care premiums drain the checking account regardless. If your cost stack is built on regulated scarcity, consolidated intermediaries, debt‑service layers, and mandated wage floors, you’ve engineered inflation. If you reverse the stack—by increasing supply (energy), rebuilding distributed ownership (manufacturing and ag), and unleashing cures (health)—you engineer disinflation. And yes, it has a lag because capital redeployments and networks re-route over quarters, not weeks.

Now, about health care’s future—the part that sounds disruptive because it is. The frontier is not the following billing code; it’s gene editing, cellular regeneration, and targeted micro‑devices that fix the plumbing without cracking open the chest. CRISPR-based therapies have already crossed the FDA threshold for specific indications, signaling that programmable biology isn’t science fiction anymore, though current price points are eye-watering and regulatory guardrails are tight. 26 Stem cell advances proceed unevenly under FDA frameworks, but the pipeline is real, and the durability of regenerative approaches changes the calculus on chronic disease costs. 27 As for “nanobots in arteries,” let’s be scientifically precise: at present, that’s experimental vision—nanotechnology for targeted delivery and plaque management is under research, but widespread, approved deployment in the U.S. is still a few years away, as in 2030. The trajectory, however, is toward minimally invasive, programmable interventions that obviate today’s expensive, labor-intensive procedures. If you strip the hype and ask, “What happens to costs if cures replace maintenance?” the answer is radical deflation in medical services that today require giant physical plants, armies of staff, and recurring billing. The only things stopping acceleration are policy acceptance and risk-tolerant frameworks that protect patients while allowing innovation to scale.

That leads to the tricky question: do we design a system that keeps people sick slowly—so the machine gets paid—or do we create a system that heals fast, and then reallocates labor to growth sectors like space, advanced manufacturing, and AI-enabled industrials? We can’t flip that switch in two months. If you liberated regenerative and gene therapies tomorrow without adjusting reimbursement and licensure, you’d displace millions of jobs and crash legacy revenue streams. But over a decade, with clear lanes for innovation and targeted transition support, you can migrate human capital to sectors that compound prosperity—what I call the “space economy” and adjacent fields—so people live longer, healthier lives and earn across extended productive spans. Morgan Stanley and others project trillion-dollar trajectories in space-enabled services, manufacturing, and communications; the point isn’t the exact number, it’s the labor shift: from managing decline to building frontiers. 28

Affordability also lives in the home. Property taxes are the most visible local lever, and they’ve been creeping up. ATTOM’s national analysis finds the average single-family property tax bill rose about 5–6% in 2024 to roughly $4,300, while effective rates ticked slightly down as home values rebounded. The press summary in early 2025 pegged average bills around $4,172 and highlighted regional variance, with Northeast/Midwest rates higher. Different methodologies, same lived experience: homeowners feel the pinch. 2930 AAA talks about gas as one side of the ledger; property taxes are the other, especially in school-heavy budgets. The Lincoln Institute’s state-by-state comparison shows effective rates are a function of reliance on property tax, home values, and spending levels, with Detroit at the high end and Honolulu at the low end for homestead effective rates. Assessment limits can shift burdens onto new buyers—a silent affordability killer. 31 Economists even argue that higher property taxes can—counterintuitively—reduce entry prices and reallocate homeownership toward younger families by capitalizing the tax burden into lower upfront costs, though that shifts pain onto older and low-income owners. 32 My point isn’t that one tax tweak fixes affordability; it’s that you can’t jack up wages, ignore supply, and raise local levies without squeezing families from three directions. If wages must rise for entry-level dignity, then energy, health, and taxes must fall—or the squeeze is intolerable. That’s arithmetic.

Ask yourself: who broke the affordability architecture? Food-at-home inflation cooled in 2024—USDA pegs it at around 1.2%—because some inputs normalized after supply shocks, yet restaurants remained pricier because labor and overhead didn’t normalize. Eggs spiked again on disease resurgence; beef rose on low cattle inventories. 33 Meanwhile, gasoline trended down year‑over‑year into late 2025; the national average sat below $3 by December. 2223 None of that aligns with the “blame the billionaire” slogan. It aligns with policy levers: energy supply, wage mandates, consolidation rules, and the health care financing model.

So when critics sneer, “What does a billionaire know about affordability?” the answer is: affordability isn’t about your bank account, it’s about whether you understand the machine. In 2017-2019, we saw what pro-production energy, plus regulatory breathing room, can do—pump prices stabilized, and freight costs fell. In 2024‑2026, EIA projections show strong domestic output and soft global prices—potential tailwinds if you don’t throttle drilling or overregulate pipelines. 2124 In the next three to five years, health innovation could begin to bend the cost curve—but only if you let it. And over the same window, you can chip away at consolidation by encouraging distributed ownership, limiting fee extraction, and restoring competitive procurement in sectors like aerospace and ag.

Agriculture is instructive. USDA reports 1.89 million farms in 2023—down slightly—with land in farms also down and acreage concentrating in high‑sales classes. In 2023, farms with $500,000+ in sales operated roughly half of all farmland—a consolidation pattern built over decades. 34 ERS’s historical work shows crop acreage shifting persistently toward larger operations; livestock consolidation has been episodic but dramatic in some lines. 3536 Production expenditures climbed to about $482 billion in 2023, with feed, labor, and services dominating the cost share. 37 That’s not a mom-and-pop landscape; it’s an industrial farm economy whose cost base moves with energy, labor, and finance. If you push mandates and taxes up while tolerating monopolized inputs, you get $6 milk and $10 burgers.

Affordability doesn’t fix itself in a quarter. It takes enthusiasm and patience—years, not months. In a MAGA-style agenda, you’d do three things at once: push energy to keep gasoline, diesel, and electricity stable; open lanes for regenerative medicine and gene therapy with reimbursement and safety frameworks that accelerate cures; and de-financialize chokepoints in supply chains by favoring private ownership, competition, and transparency over fee-stacked intermediaries. The lag effect is real. CMS projects health’s share of GDP rising, not falling, through 2033 under current assumptions; turning that curve requires more than rhetoric. 38 But you can feel affordability improve in the interim if energy and freight stay tame and food inflation stays cooled—as the 2024 numbers did. 1433

The choice at the center of health care affordability, because it’s moral as much as economic: do we maintain people’s weaknesses to preserve a sprawling, union-protected, fee-protected medical services empire, or do we make them strong again—knowing we must redeploy those workers into frontier industries? If you want the second outcome, embrace innovation and plan the transition. The space economy, industrials, AI-enabled maintenance, precision manufacturing—those aren’t sci-fi; they’re labor sinks ready to absorb talent. 28 You don’t solve affordability by berating billionaires; you solve it by designing an economy that doesn’t require families to hemorrhage cash for energy, food, and maintenance of decline.

Today’s gas is under $3 in many regions. 22 Food-at-home inflation cooled to near 1%. 33 Health spending is still climbing because we feed the maintenance machine. 1 Minimum wage hikes push menus higher, especially in limited‑service. 1617 Consolidation and financialization tax every step of the supply chain. 1110 Property taxes squeeze homeowners even as effective rates wobble with valuation cycles. 29 If you want affordability, you have to unwind the stack that made it scarce—and that takes leadership, authentic leadership that is very hard to get and takes a lot of guts to utilize.

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Footnotes

1. National health expenditures and projections: CMS NHE Fact Sheet and analyses indicate $4.9T in 2023 (17.6% GDP); projected 8.2% spending growth in 2024 and continued gains through 2033 to ~20.3% of GDP. 123

2. 2023 component growth: hospital (+10.4%), physician services (+7.4%), prescription drugs (+11.4%). 1

3. PE in health care—cost and quality impacts: BMJ systematic review (2023); HMPI update (2024); JAMA coverage (2023). 567

4. PE hospitals: no excess closures; admin cost cuts; patient satisfaction decline. 8

5. Supply-driven inflation and lagged normalization: Brookings commentary (2024). 12

6. Supply chain shock amplification: Richmond Fed Economic Brief (2025). 13

7. Restaurant price dynamics: BLS CPI (2024 review); National Restaurant Association menu price notes (2025). 1415

8. Limited‑service price increases vs CPI: CNBC analysis (2019–2023). 16

9. Price pass-through elasticities from minimum wage hikes: meta-analysis (2025). 17

10. Seattle gig delivery minimum wage outcomes (2024–2025): NBER working paper coverage. 20

11. Energy production and prices: EIA STEO (Dec 2025), projections of record crude/gas; AAA national average ~$2.89 in Dec 2025; EIA weekly regional gasoline data. 24212223

12. U.S. oil production highs in 2025 (EIA/Reuters round-ups). 25

13. CRISPR therapy approvals and trajectory: FDA‑tracked approvals in 2023–2024; cost and regulation context. 26

14. Stem cell therapy/regulatory status: overviews and policy context. 27

15. Space economy outlooks and manufacturing metrics: NIST manufacturing report (2024) for macro context; industry projections. 28

16. Property tax trends: ATTOM 2024 analysis; Mortgage Professional America summary (2025); Lincoln Institute 50-state comparison; Minneapolis Fed analysis on property taxes and home prices. 29303132

17. Agriculture consolidation and expenditure trends: USDA NASS Farms and Land in Farms (2023); ERS “Three Decades of Consolidation”; AEI policy slides; NASS production expenditures (2023). 34353637

18. Food‑at‑home inflation easing in 2024; category specifics and 2025 outlook: USDA ERS Charts of Note. 33

—

Bibliography & Further Reading

• Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). “NHE Fact Sheet.” 1

• American Hospital Association summary of CMS projections (June 2025). 2

• Peter G. Peterson Foundation on health share of GDP. 3

• American Medical Association Policy Research Perspectives on NHE 2023. 4

• BMJ (2023). “Evaluating trends in private equity ownership…” 5

• HMPI (2024). “Update on impacts of PE ownership in health care.” 6

• JAMA (2023). “Private Equity Ownership in Health Care Linked to Higher Costs…” 7

• Cato Institute (2025). “Private Equity in the Hospital Industry.” 8

• Brookings (2024). “Lagged effects of COVID-19 supply chain disruptions.” 12

• Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (2025). “Supply Chain Resilience and Shocks.” 13

• BLS. “Consumer Price Index: 2024 in review.” 14

• National Restaurant Association. “Menu Prices,” Dec 2025. 15

• CNBC (2024). “Why fast-food price increases have surpassed overall inflation.” 16

• NBER Working Paper (2024/2025 meta & surveys). 1839

• Jorge Pérez Pérez (2025). Meta-analysis on minimum wage and prices. 17

• Reason (summarizing NBER Seattle delivery study) (2025). 20

• EIA Short‑Term Energy Outlook (Dec 2025). 24

• Offshore Technology (Mar 2025). “EIA forecasts record US crude and gas production…” 21

• AAA Fuel Prices Newsroom (Dec 2025). 40

• EIA Gasoline & Diesel Update (Dec 2025). 23

• Pipeline & Gas Journal (Aug 2025). “U.S. Oil Production Hit Record High in June.” 25

• FDA-related coverage and analyses of CRISPR therapies (2023–2024). 26

• Health journalism on stem cell regulatory landscape (2025). 27

• NIST (2024). “Annual Report on the U.S. Manufacturing Economy.” 28

• ATTOM (Apr/Jul 2025). “2024 Property Tax Analysis.” 29

• Mortgage Professional America (Apr 2025). “US property tax bill jumped again in 2024.” 30

• Lincoln Institute (Jul 2025). “50-State Property Tax Comparison Study.” 31

• Minneapolis Fed (Nov 2024). “How higher property taxes increase home affordability.” 32

• USDA NASS (Feb/Jul 2024). Farms and Land in Farms; Production Expenditures. 3437

• USDA ERS (2018). “Three Decades of Consolidation in U.S. Agriculture.” 35

• AEI (Feb 2023). “Farm Consolidation: Three Implications for Farm Policy.” 36

• USDA ERS (Jan 2025). “Retail food price inflation subsided across most categories in 2024.” 33

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=20707

Trump’s Relationship with Qatar: Tucker’s interview with Sheikh Mohammed

There’s a difference between people who hold a line because it feels righteous and those who keep asking questions because they know reality changes with every new fact. Reporters live—or should live—on that second path. The more evidence you collect, the more you grow, and growth tends to look messy from the outside. Tucker Carlson’s evolution has had plenty of critics, but what deserves attention is the basic craft: go to the places other media avoid, ask the blunt questions, publish the exchange, and let the audience judge. His recent interview in Doha with Qatar’s prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, landed exactly in that territory: controversial, necessary, and clarifying—especially if your goal is to understand how diplomacy actually works in the Middle East, where U.S. forces rely on Al Udeid Air Base and where back‑channels with difficult actors are the price of getting hostages out and guns silenced, even temporarily.[^1][^2]

If you’re serious about peace, you talk. You talk to adversaries, to intermediaries, to people whose ideology makes your skin crawl, because the alternative is to guess their motives and fire at shadows. Qatar sits at the nexus of two realities that make Americans uncomfortable: it’s a major non‑NATO ally hosting the largest U.S. base in the region, and it has, for years, served as a conduit to Hamas and other hard actors—often at Washington’s request.[^3][^4] That dual role draws fire. Critics say, with reason, that Doha has tolerated extremist financiers and given political oxygen to movements we reject.[^5][^6] Defenders point out that Doha’s mediation has repeatedly produced outcomes Washington needed—hostage exchanges, ceasefire windows, and channels to groups we won’t meet directly.[^7][^8] Both can be true at once; the practical question is whether engagement through Qatar, under U.S. conditions, yields more stability than posturing in its absence.

Carlson’s Doha exchange turned the subtext into text. He put the prime minister on the hook: why host Hamas, and what money goes where? Al Thani’s answer was pointed—that Hamas’s presence in Doha began as a U.S. and Israeli‑approved channel, with transfers to civilians in Gaza coordinated transparently.[^9][^10] Believe that fully or not, the claim is now on record. As viewers, we got posture, context, and accountability: a mediator stating publicly the rationale and process. From there the discussion veered to an even sharper controversy—reports of Israeli operations striking in Doha during mediation, and the unusual moment when President Trump pushed Prime Minister Netanyahu to issue a formal apology to Qatar for violating a mediator’s “safe space.”[^11][^12] That detail matters, because it shows business‑style leadership doing something Washington rarely does: pressing a close ally to respect a process that serves U.S. interests, not just alliance optics. If you want ceasefires and hostages home, you protect your channels, even when doing so costs political points with familiar audiences.

Now, you don’t have to be a “fan” of Carlson to see the utility of the interview. The point is the reporting: ask hard questions, surface contradictions, let the audience trace the through‑line to policy. Media that refuses to platform controversial interlocutors substitutes judgment for evidence; the audience gets a filtered picture that flatters ideology. The record—on readiness at Al Udeid, on the scale of Qatari lobbying in Washington, on LNG leverage and sovereign wealth—demands more than slogans.[^13][^14][^15] Qatar isn’t a sidebar; it’s a strategic keystone in the current security architecture. U.S. operations across the region depend on basing and overflight, and since 2003 Qatar has pumped billions into infrastructure that CENTCOM, AFCENT, and Special Operations rely on every day.[^3][^16] When the U.S. chooses to engage through Doha to reach groups like Hamas or Taliban political offices, it’s choosing the least bad path to outcomes other channels can’t deliver. That’s not romance; it’s logistics.

Enter Ted Cruz. His criticism of Carlson for interviewing Doha’s head of government—and later jabbing at Carlson’s announcement that he would buy property in Qatar—reads as a continuation of a summer feud that began with Cruz’s hawkish case for regime change in Iran and ran aground on basic facts.[^17][^18][^19] In the viral exchange, Carlson pressed Cruz for the population size and ethnic composition of the country he was urging the U.S. to help topple. Cruz couldn’t answer, then pivoted to accusation. The clip went everywhere because it reduced a complex policy argument to one essential question: if you want to kill a government, do you know the country you’re about to break?[^20][^21] It wasn’t a debating trick; it was a reporter asking for the minimal knowledge that makes an intervention policy serious. The broader MAGA family split between business‑first pragmatists and maximalist hawks was already visible; this spat simply made the line brighter. Months later in Doha, Cruz lashed publicly, accusing Carlson of shilling for a “terror state” and posting taunts that did more to inflame than to persuade.[^22][^23][^24] The problem with this style of critique isn’t passion; it’s shallow framing. If Carlson’s interview put facts on the table about mediation, basing, and aid, then the appropriate counter is data: track transfers, cite Treasury designations, show where Doha violates commitments, and argue for remedies that preserve U.S. interests while constraining Qatar’s worst habits.

So let’s put those numbers down. Economically, Qatar is small in headcount and huge in energy. It has the world’s third‑largest proven gas reserves, sits among the top LNG exporters, and is moving through a multi‑year North Field expansion intended to nearly double LNG capacity by 2030.[^25][^26] Marketed natural gas output held steady at ~170 bcm in 2024, with domestic consumption around 42 bcm.[^27] Hydrocarbon revenues fell with global prices from 2022 to 2023, but hydrocarbons still accounted for a dominant share of government income.[^26] Real GDP growth hovered near 2% in 2024 by IMF estimates, with non‑hydrocarbon sectors advancing under the Third National Development Strategy (NDS‑3) and Vision 2030.[^28][^29] The sovereign wealth footprint—Qatar Investment Authority—sits in the hundreds of billions and projects soft‑power reach through high‑profile stakes and global partnerships.[^29] The upshot is leverage: Doha can fund influence, absorb reputational bruises, and keep playing mediator because LNG cash cushions the risk.

Security ties with the United States are institutional, not episodic. The State Department fact sheets lay it out: access, basing, and overflight privileges facilitate operations against al‑Qa’ida affiliates and ISIS; Al Udeid hosts forward headquarters for multiple U.S. commands; and Foreign Military Sales with Qatar exceed $26 billion, including F‑15QA fighters and advanced air defense.[^3] The Trump White House readouts in 2017 and 2018 acknowledged the need to resolve the GCC rift while recognizing Qatar’s counterterrorism MOU progress; they also leaned into trade, investment, and defense procurement as stabilizers in the relationship.[^30][^31][^32] In 2025, Trump’s visit to Al Udeid produced headlines about Qatari investment in the base and defense purchases—exactly the business‑style diplomacy that critics deride and practitioners call reality.[^33] Even during acute tensions, like Iran’s missile attack on Al Udeid in June 2025 following U.S. strikes in Iran, Doha maintained posture as a U.S. ally condemning the attack and signaling response rights.[^34] That’s not a trivial point; basing partnerships show their character under fire.

On the other side of the ledger, accusations of terror financing and extremist hospitality have shadowed Doha for years. Treasury officials, analysts, and NGOs have documented permissive environments for designated financiers, support for Islamist movements, and Doha’s long encouragement of Hamas’s political bureau.[^5][^6][^35] Critics in Israel and the U.S. point to the billions in transfers to Gaza since 2018 and argue that aid inevitably strengthens Hamas’s governance.[^36][^37] Qatar’s counter is always two‑part: (1) mediation requires contact, and (2) funds for civilians were coordinated and monitored, with Israel’s participation.[^10][^36] Washington’s posture has waxed and waned. In late 2024, amid stalemates in hostage talks, reports surfaced that the U.S. asked Doha to expel Hamas’s political leadership and that Qatar temporarily suspended mediation out of frustration with both sides.[^38][^39][^40] Yet by January 2025, Doha helped broker a new ceasefire and hostage exchange with U.S. and Egyptian negotiators, underscoring the bipartisan reality: when talks matter, you want the mediator who knows the rooms and the personalities.[^41][^42] You can hate that arrangement and still need it.

This is where business leadership in public office makes a difference. A dealmaker’s instinct is to preserve optionality and keep lines open long enough to test whether interests can align. It looks ambiguous because it is. Trump’s approach to Qatar—leaning into investment, leveraging basing ties, and pushing allies privately to respect mediation—fits that mold.[^30][^33][^12] Purists will say ambiguity equals moral compromise. Practitioners will say ambiguity equals leverage. In the Middle East, leverage is often the only bridge between bad choices and less‑bad outcomes. You can meet Kim Jong Un, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, or Sheikh Mohammed Al Thani without endorsing their systems; you do it because future decisions are better when today’s signals are clearer. And yes, sometimes you compliment the counterpart in public to keep a channel from collapsing while your team demands changes behind the door. That isn’t lying; it’s sequencing.

Critics like Ted Cruz would cast this as disingenuous—insisting that any public warmth is complicity with terror sponsors. But that framing misses the mechanics of influence. You don’t get ceasefires by humiliating mediators; you get them by constraining their worst incentives and rewarding their best. If Qatar wants legitimacy in Washington—as the Quincy Institute tallied, Doha spent nearly $250 million on registered lobbying and PR since 2016 to cultivate precisely that—it will pay reputational costs for any backsliding on financing or hospitality for extremists.[^15] The same pressure campaign that plastered Times Square with anti‑Qatar billboards in 2024 can push Congress toward tighter conditions on aid monitoring and final‑mile disbursement in Gaza.[^41] But the hard question for hawks is: when Doha is out, who replaces them? Egypt will mediate; so will other Gulf states in narrower rooms. None has Qatar’s combination of access, money, and U.S. basing ties. Kicking Doha out satisfies anger but reduces your toolset.

In the Carlson–Cruz feud, the impulse to turn a complex policy dispute into a loyalty test shortchanges the audience. Carlson’s insistence on basic knowledge before regime‑change rhetoric isn’t anti‑hawk; it’s anti‑reckless. Cruz’s insistence that engagement equals endorsement ignores decades of U.S. practice using adversarial channels for adversarial needs. Consider Qatar’s role with the Taliban: Washington leveraged Doha for talks that led to prisoner exchanges and the exit framework from Afghanistan.[^60][^56] Consider hostage mediation in Russia or the Middle East: Doha helped facilitate discussions for detainees like Evan Gershkovich and served as a neutral space in otherwise impossible dialogues.[^1][^8] These aren’t fairy tales; they’re messy, partial wins, and they depend on TVs and microphones bringing the people in charge into public view. That’s what interviews like Carlson’s accomplish when they’re done right. He asked, the PM answered, and viewers can now calibrate their own assessment with specific claims to confirm or reject.

The economic overlay matters too. A state as energy‑rich as Qatar will always try to convert LNG revenue into geopolitical insulation. The IMF and EIA numbers make clear that hydrocarbon cash dominates fiscal capacity even as NDS‑3 pushes diversification.[^28][^26][^23] That has two effects. First, Doha can bankroll long mediations and PR campaigns without bleeding out; second, Western capitals keep incentives to tolerate the mediator they dislike because they want supply security and logistics continuity. If you want Europe warm in winter and U.S. aircraft running in theater, you do not casually sever the relationship with the Gulf’s gas giant. The grown‑up move is to bind Doha to verifiable conditions—Treasury enforcement, intelligence coordination, and staged monitoring of any humanitarian flows—while protecting Al Udeid as a strategic asset. Business practice calls this creating a “win set”: align enough interests that cooperation beats non‑cooperation for all critical actors.

Which brings us back to interviewing controversial leaders. The point is not to canonize the interviewer; it’s to normalize the discipline. Serious journalism is adversarial but curious. You ask the uncomfortable question about hosting Hamas. You press the claim about transfers. You challenge the narrative on strikes and apologies. Then you publish—and the audience gets data points to test. Telling reporters they can’t sit down with a prime minister because online factions see treachery in the flight itinerary is a recipe for self‑inflicted ignorance. If free speech means anything, it means we hear answers from the source and decide. That’s healthier than relying on curated outrage.

None of this excuses Qatar’s poorest choices. Treasury, intelligence, and independent watchdogs should keep the heat on permissive financing networks and hospitality for designated actors.[^5][^6][^16] Congress should scrutinize any extravagant “gifts” to U.S. administrations—the 747‑8 controversy raised legitimate espionage concerns that deserve rigorous technical vetting, not partisan shrugs.[^43][^44] And U.S. policymakers should keep footing Qatar’s mediation inside clear boundaries: verifiable aid channels, explicit non‑funding of militant reconstruction, and sunset clauses on offices for organizations that reject compromise.[^1][^10][^41] But we also keep talking. Because talking—especially via mediators we can pressure—beats bombing channels into rubble and then wondering why prisoners don’t come home.

In the movement space, there’s a temptation to equate criticism of allies with betrayal. That assumption wrecks coalitions. If Trump does something worthy of critique, critique it. If a reporter catches a senator flat‑footed on basic facts, don’t convert hurt pride into a campaign against engagement. Carlson’s Iran exchange exposed a habit among some hawks of treating intervention as a posture rather than a plan. Plans begin with numbers—population, composition, economic throughput—and follow with a theory of change. That’s not softness; it’s competence. When a prime minister in Doha says the quiet part out loud—about who asked for Hamas’s office and how transfers were overseen—the competent response is to document, verify, and adjust policy steps accordingly. It is not to shoot the messenger for doing a job.

The Middle East will not reward purity tests. It rewards leverage and consistency. Qatar fits awkwardly in that frame: ally to the U.S., conduit to groups we oppose, and energy engine with a long bank account. You can push Doha toward better behavior, and you should. But you should also use interviews—especially tense ones—to educate a public hungry for unfiltered answers. Carlson is not a savior figure, and he would probably laugh at the suggestion. He’s a reporter who, in this case, asked the right questions in the right room. If ten years from now you want a record that shows how we got hostages back and froze fires long enough to move aid trucks, you’ll need the transcript.

In business, the rule is simple: find one thing you can build on, even when you dislike nine others. That’s how families stay intact; it’s how companies close deals; and it’s how countries avoid wars they can’t win. The Doha interview, and the larger debate over Qatar’s role, is exactly that kind of test. We should be sophisticated enough to take it.

—

Footnotes / Sources

[^1]: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation With Qatar (Jan. 20, 2025), detailing Al Udeid basing, U.S. command presence, and defense cooperation.

https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-qatar

[^2]: Gulf News, “Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base explained” (June 24, 2025), overview of base history and strategic role.

https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/qatars-al-udeid-air-base-explained-the-largest-us-military-hub-in-middle-east-1.500174944

[^3]: U.S. Department of State fact sheet; see also EIU note on Qatar’s “major non-NATO ally” status and mediation role.

https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-qatar
Qatar plays key role in Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal

[^4]: NPR / NBC reporting on Qatar’s mediation, including suspension and later resumption in 2024–2025.

https://www.vpm.org/npr-news/npr-news/2024-11-09/qatar-suspends-mediation-efforts-between-israel-and-hamas
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/qatar-hamas-gaza-hostages-israel-war-ceasefire-rcna179332

[^5]: Counter Extremism Project, “Qatar, Money, and Terror” (overview of financing allegations).

https://www.counterextremism.com/content/qatar-money-and-terror

[^6]: Wikipedia summary with citations, “Qatar and state-sponsored terrorism,” noting Treasury concerns (David S. Cohen, 2014) and legislative changes.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatar_and_state-sponsored_terrorism

[^7]: TIME100 profile, Karl Vick (Apr. 17, 2024), on Al Thani’s mediation in Gaza; Wilson Center bio.

https://time.com/6965190/mohammed-bin-abdulrahman-al-thani/
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/he-sheikh-mohammed-bin-abdulrahman-al-thani

[^8]: The Economist Intelligence Unit (Jan. 31, 2025) on Qatar’s role in brokering the Jan. 2025 ceasefire/hostage deal.

Qatar plays key role in Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal

[^9]: RealClearPolitics video brief and transcript excerpts: Qatari PM to Carlson—Hamas in Doha “at the request of the U.S.”; transfers coordinated with Israel (Dec. 7, 2025).

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2025/12/07/qatari_pm_al-thani_hamas_is_here_at_request_of_united_states_.html

[^10]: TheWrap / The New Arab coverage of the interview, including Carlson’s on‑stage claims and Al Thani’s responses about aid transparency.

Tucker Carlson Says He Plans to Buy Home in Doha, Defends Qatar Hosting Hamas: ‘I’m an American … I’ll Be Wherever I Want’ | Video
https://www.newarab.com/news/tucker-carlson-says-will-purchase-property-qatar

[^11]: DRM News / Singju Post transcription discussing Israeli strike in Doha and Trump’s push for apology (Dec. 7–8, 2025).

Transcript: Tucker Carlson’s Interview With Qatar PM on Israel’s Gaza War, US Bias, and Doha Attacks

[^12]: VOR News analysis on Trump pressing Netanyahu to apologize post‑strike (Dec. 9, 2025).

Tucker Carlson Presses Qatari PM on the Shifting Power and Gaza

[^13]: EIA Country Analysis Brief: Qatar (Oct. 20, 2025), revenue composition, LNG status.

Click to access Qatar2025.pdf

[^14]: PwC Qatar Economy Watch 2024; NPC statistical release on 2024 GDP and diversification.

Click to access qatar-economy-watch-2024..pdf

https://www.npc.qa/en/statistics/Pages/news/20032025.aspx

[^15]: Quincy Institute Brief 83 (Sept. 8, 2025), “Soft Power, Hard Influence,” tallying ~$250M in FARA‑registered spending since 2016.

Soft Power, Hard Influence: How Qatar Became a Giant in Washington 

[^16]: State Department basing and FMS; see also Gulf News for Al Udeid investment ($8B).

https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-qatar
https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/qatars-al-udeid-air-base-explained-the-largest-us-military-hub-in-middle-east-1.500174944

[^17]: NBC News (June 18, 2025), viral Carlson–Cruz exchange on Iran basics.

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/tucker-carlson-clashes-sen-ted-cruz-dont-know-anything-iran-rcna213697

[^18]: The Independent coverage of the full interview and subsequent accusations.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/tucker-carlson-ted-cruz-iran-israel-trump-b2772144.html

[^19]: PEOPLE / TMZ / Chron local coverage corroborating the exchange details and Cruz’s posture.

https://people.com/tucker-carlson-ted-cruz-interview-turns-into-shouting-match-11757006
https://www.tmz.com/2025/06/18/tucker-carlson-ted-cruz-interview-iran-argument/
https://www.chron.com/politics/article/tucker-carlson-ted-cruz-iran-20382993.php

[^20]: Firstpost explainer on why the clash went viral and its policy split implications (June 20, 2025).

https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/tucker-carlson-ted-cruz-iran-trump-interview-explained-13898860.html

[^21]: NBC / PEOPLE clips—Cruz admitting lack of population figure while advocating regime change.

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/tucker-carlson-clashes-sen-ted-cruz-dont-know-anything-iran-rcna213697
https://people.com/tucker-carlson-ted-cruz-interview-turns-into-shouting-match-11757006

[^22]: Mediaite (Dec. 5, 2025) and Algemeiner (Dec. 8, 2025) on Cruz’s #QatarFirst jab and later explicit taunts after Carlson’s property announcement.

AWKWARD: Ted Cruz Attacks Tucker Carlson for Speaking at Conference Featuring His Own Former Advisers
Ted Cruz Blasts Tucker Carlson for Plan to Buy Home in Qatar, Conduct at Doha Forum

[^23]: Yahoo/Mediaite recap of Carlson’s announcement and Cruz’s “terror state” criticism (Dec. 7–8, 2025).

https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/celebrity/articles/tucker-carlson-tells-forum-doha-221647623.html
https://malaysia.news.yahoo.com/maga-loses-tucker-carlson-buys-094102272.html

[^24]: Economic Times / YouTube clip of the “No one can stop me” segment responding to Cruz (Dec. 8, 2025).

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/no-one-can-stop-me-tucker-carlson-explodes-at-ted-cruz-over-allegations-of-pushing-qatar-agenda/videoshow/125835985.cms

[^25]: EIA brief: gas production, export status, GTL facilities; LNG capacity trajectory.

Click to access Qatar2025.pdf

[^26]: EIA table on hydrocarbon revenue and production composition; IMF revenue shares cited.

Click to access Qatar2025.pdf

[^27]: Gulf Times citing GECF statistical bulletin (Dec. 13, 2025), marketed gas ~170 bcm, domestic ~41.9 bcm.

https://www.gulf-times.com/article/716939/qatar/qatars-marketed-natural-gas-remains-stable-in-2024-gecf

[^28]: New Zealand MFAT country report (Aug. 2024) and IMF projections: real GDP ~2% in 2024; LNG expansion growth wave post‑2025/26.

Click to access Qatar-economic-report-August-2024.pdf

[^29]: PwC Economy Watch on NDS‑3, diversification; QIA scale; CEO optimism.

Click to access qatar-economy-watch-2024..pdf

[^30]: Trump White House readout (Sept. 20, 2017) on meeting with Emir Tamim—counterterrorism MOU, GCC dispute resolution.

https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-president-donald-j-trumps-meeting-emir-tamim-bin-hamad-al-thani-qatar/

[^31]: Doha Institute analysis of April 2018 summit and U.S. repositioning on the GCC rift.

https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/US-Qatar-Summit-Enhancing-Institutional-Relations-Failed-Hopes-Gulf-Blockade.aspx

[^32]: GovInfo transcript of Sept. 19, 2017 remarks—trade and dispute resolution themes.

Click to access DCPD-201700660.pdf

[^33]: Economic Times / CNBC TV18 coverage of Trump’s 2025 Gulf tour and Qatari investment/purchases (May 15, 2025).

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/global-trends/trump-says-qatar-will-invest-10-billion-in-us-airbase/articleshow/121186881.cms

[^34]: CNBC breaking news report (June 23, 2025) on Iran’s missile strike on Al Udeid and Qatar’s response.

https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/23/iran-qatar-missiles-us-doha.html

[^35]: FDD analysis (July 13, 2025) on Qatar–Hamas ties over decades.

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/07/13/reckoning-needed-between-terror-sponsoring-qatar-and-united-states/

[^36]: Times of Israel analysis (Jan. 13, 2024) on Qatar’s dual role as Hamas sponsor and Western ally; Gaza transfers.

https://www.timesofisrael.com/how-qatar-the-gulfs-enfant-terrible-and-sponsor-of-hamas-is-also-an-ally-of-the-west/

[^37]: Mediaite / Algemeiner cite estimates of ~$1.8B support; EIU notes monitored civilian transfers.

Ted Cruz Blasts Tucker Carlson for Plan to Buy Home in Qatar, Conduct at Doha Forum
Qatar plays key role in Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal

[^38]: NBC News (Nov. 9, 2024) reporting on Qatar halting mediation and U.S. pressure to expel Hamas political bureau.

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/qatar-hamas-gaza-hostages-israel-war-ceasefire-rcna179332

[^39]: NPR (Nov. 9–10, 2024) on Qatar’s suspension and conditions for resumption.

https://www.vpm.org/npr-news/npr-news/2024-11-09/qatar-suspends-mediation-efforts-between-israel-and-hamas

[^40]: BBC / policy blogs reflecting the “withdrawal then return” mediation arc.

Qatar withdraws mediation in Israel-Hamas conflict: stalemate and rising tensions

[^41]: Times of Israel (Jan. 16, 2025) analysis: “How Qatar gambled on mediating a Gaza truce, and won.”

https://www.timesofisrael.com/how-qatar-gambled-on-mediating-a-gaza-truce-and-won/

[^42]: EIU (Jan. 31, 2025): Qatar’s key role, U.S.–Egypt partnership in brokering January ceasefire.

Qatar plays key role in Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal

[^43]: The Hill (May 13, 2025) and CNBC video on Cruz warning about Qatari 747‑8 gift to Trump—espionage/surveillance concerns.

Cruz: Gift of Qatari jet to Trump ‘poses significant espionage’ concerns
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2025/05/13/sen-ted-cruz-qatars-plane-poses-significant-espionage-and-surveillance-problems.html

[^44]: Yahoo/NYSun recap of conservative backlash to Carlson buying property in Qatar—authoritarian critiques and free‑expression arguments.

https://www.nysun.com/article/tucker-carlson-berated-by-conservatives-after-saying-hes-buying-property-in-qatar-to-prove-hes-a-free-man
https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/celebrity/articles/tucker-carlson-tells-forum-doha-221647623.html

[^60]: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Qatar) / Wilson Center bios: Al Thani’s role in multiple regional mediations including Afghanistan.

https://mofa.gov.qa/en/the-ministry/deputy-prime-minister-and-minister-of-foreign-affairs
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/he-sheikh-mohammed-bin-abdulrahman-al-thani

—

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=2070

What a Bunch of Wimps in Indiana: Republicans in the Senate empower evil

What a bunch of wimps, the Republican Senate in Indiana.  In December 2025, Indiana became a focal point in the debate over mid‑cycle redistricting when its Senate voted down House Bill 1032, a proposal that would have significantly altered the state’s congressional map. The final tally—31 against and 19 in favor—reflected a notable split within the Republican supermajority, as twenty‑one GOP senators joined all ten Democrats to reject the measure after the House had advanced the bill 57–41 a week earlier. Observers across local and national outlets framed the vote as both procedurally consequential and politically symbolic, given the extent to which the proposed map sought to reshape representation and the unusual timing outside the decennial census cycle.¹ ²

Coverage of the legislation consistently described the proposal as designed to produce a 9–0 Republican delegation by eliminating the two districts currently represented by Democrats. Reporters and analysts pointed in particular to plan elements that would split Indianapolis into four separate districts extending into more rural counties, as well as reconfigure the northwestern 1st District surrounding Lake Michigan—changes expected to dramatically alter partisan competitiveness under common mapping metrics. Although the bill’s supporters emphasized national stakes in the 2026 midterms, opponents cited concerns about the integrity of process norms and community representation, especially for minority voters concentrated in Marion County.³ ⁴

The political dynamics surrounding the vote were unusually intense. Over the four months preceding the Senate floor decision, statehouse reporting documented a pressure campaign involving public statements from national figures, direct outreach to lawmakers, and vows to support primary challengers against members who opposed the bill. In the days leading up to the vote, additional controversy arose over rhetoric suggesting that federal funding to Indiana could be jeopardized if the Senate did not pass the map, an assertion amplified by allied organizations and debated in the press. Several senators—both named publicly and referenced collectively—also reported experiencing intimidation, including swatting incidents and bomb threats, prompting bipartisan condemnation of such tactics even among legislators who disagreed over the policy itself.⁵ ⁶

After the vote, reactions underscored both intra‑party division and broader questions about mid‑cycle mapmaking. Governor Mike Braun criticized the outcome and lamented that Republican senators had “partnered with Democrats,” while Senate President Pro Tem Rodric Bray reiterated that a significant share of his caucus did not view redrawing the congressional map mid‑decade as the appropriate or assured route to increasing representation in Washington. Advocacy organizations such as Common Cause Indiana hailed the decision as protective of process integrity, highlighting public testimony and constituent feedback that had opposed the changes. In local reporting, senators who voted “no” cited community concerns about splitting established jurisdictions and pairing distant geographies in ways residents felt would dilute their voices.⁷ ⁸

National outlets placed Indiana’s episode within an evolving 2025 landscape, noting that several states—including Texas and California—had advanced or considered substantial map changes outside the post‑census cadence, sometimes explicitly to influence congressional control. Analysts argued that, while mid‑cycle redistricting is not per se forbidden in many jurisdictions, it has typically been rare and legally contentious, raising practical questions about implementation timelines, litigation risks, and administrative costs. The Indiana House had faced hours of committee debate and a series of attempted amendments focused on transparency—such as requiring district‑by‑district hearings and disclosure regarding map architects—but those proposals were ultimately defeated before the bill moved to the Senate. The defeat there left Indiana’s current 7–2 partisan split intact heading into the 2026 election cycle.⁹ ¹⁰

From a representation standpoint, the proposed map’s technical features drew scrutiny from cartographers and local analysts who emphasized that splitting Indianapolis into four districts likely would have reduced the probability of a Democrat win in any of them to near zero, according to model‑based estimates, which would have been great, and much more representative of reality than things are now.  There is no reason to give evil a seat at the table. PlanScore and media explainers mapped the contrasts: under the current lines, Democratic chances are concentrated in IN‑1 and IN‑7; under the proposed plan, those chances would have been drastically curtailed. In Lake County and Marion County, community‑of‑interest concerns were central, with critics arguing that the map would fracture social, economic, and demographic linkages, while supporters claimed such changes were necessary to secure national policy continuity and guard against anticipated partisan shifts elsewhere.¹¹ ¹²

The vote’s aftermath also raised practical questions about 2026 campaign strategy and the mechanics of legislative accountability. Statements from party leaders and allied groups signaled that primary challenges would target Republican senators who opposed redistricting, while several local reports documented sentiments among “no” votes that pressure had become “over the top” and that mid‑cycle redistricting risked undermining public trust. Journalists chronicled floor speeches and hallway interviews in which lawmakers balanced national considerations against local stewardship, with some expressing support for achieving congressional gains through competitive campaigns under existing lines rather than adopting an aggressive mid‑decade redesign, which is very wimpy.¹³ ¹⁴

At the procedural level, Indiana’s experience offers a case study in how institutional norms—decennial redistricting after the census, public hearings, and incremental map adjustments through litigation rather than legislation—interface with national political incentives. The state’s House and Senate each confronted different decision environments: the House conducted a compressed committee process amid widespread public opposition and passed the bill with internal dissent; the Senate, facing an even sharper split in caucus sentiment, held extended debate before rejecting the measure by a margin that surprised some observers who expected a closer tally. Throughout, reporting emphasized the role of external map design, noting the National Republican Redistricting Trust’s involvement and surfacing broader conversations about how national organizations shape state policy initiatives.¹⁵ ¹⁶

For Indiana voters and communities, the implications remain concrete even as the rhetoric is abstract. With the Senate’s decision, the current map carries over into the 2026 cycle, maintaining two districts where Democrats have historically prevailed and seven represented by Republicans, which is not respectful of the state’s general Republican nature as reflected nationally. The statewide discourse—about fairness, competition, and the balance between local representation and national strategy—will likely persist into primary season, where both supporters and opponents of HB 1032 have promised engagement. Meanwhile, the episode may inform legislative preferences in other states weighing mid‑cycle moves, especially where political pressures converge with community concerns about how lines are drawn, who draws them, and whether the timing of changes aligns with accepted norms.  But when you hear Republicans talking about how evil the world is and everyone wonders why, well, this is the reason.  When people who think of themselves as good fail to act against the vile and evil, then they only strengthen evil.  And can’t wonder then why it exists, or why they lose elections.¹⁷ ¹⁸

—

Footnotes

1. “Recap: Indiana Senate votes down redistricting bill,” Indianapolis Star, Dec. 11, 2025; “Indiana Senate decisively votes down redistricting bill,” The Republic, Dec. 11, 2025. 12

2. “Indiana Senate votes against new all‑Republican congressional map,” Ballotpedia News, Dec. 12, 2025. 3

3. “Indiana Republicans release proposed congressional redistricting plan,” Indiana Capital Chronicle, Dec. 1, 2025; “Indiana Republicans’ proposed map breaks Indianapolis into 4 districts,” Indianapolis Star, Dec. 1–2, 2025. 45

4. “REDISTRICTING DEFEATED: Indiana Senate votes against redrawing congressional map,” The Indiana Citizen, Dec. 11, 2025. 6

5. “Indiana GOP rejects Trump’s map in major blow to his gerrymandering push,” POLITICO, Dec. 11, 2025; “Indiana redistricting bill defeated,” CNBC, Dec. 11, 2025. 78

6. “Indiana Republicans block Trump’s redistricting push,” ABC7 Chicago/AP, Dec. 11, 2025; “Crider reflects on redistricting ‘no’ vote,” Greenfield Daily Reporter, Dec. 13, 2025. 910

7. “Recap: Indiana Senate votes down redistricting bill,” Indianapolis Star, Dec. 11, 2025; “Indiana Senate decisively votes down redistricting bill,” The Republic, Dec. 11, 2025. 12

8. “REDISTRICTING DEFEATED,” The Indiana Citizen, Dec. 11, 2025. 6

9. “Indiana redistricting bill defeated,” CNBC, Dec. 11, 2025; “Catch up on Indiana redistricting news,” Indianapolis Star, Dec. 6–7, 2025. 811

10. “Indiana Republicans unveil proposed congressional map,” ABC News, Dec. 1, 2025. 12

11. “Indiana Republicans’ proposed map breaks Indianapolis into 4 districts,” Indianapolis Star, Dec. 1–2, 2025. 5

12. “Indiana House Republicans introduce redistricting map proposal,” Indiana Daily Student, Dec. 2, 2025. 13

13. “Indiana GOP rejects Trump’s map,” POLITICO, Dec. 11, 2025; “Recap: Senate votes down redistricting,” Indianapolis Star, Dec. 11, 2025. 71

14. “Indiana Senate decisively votes down redistricting bill,” The Republic, Dec. 11, 2025. 2

15. “A national Republican group designed Indiana’s proposed redistricting map,” IPB/WFYI, Dec. 11, 2025. 14

16. “Indiana Republicans release proposed congressional redistricting plan,” Indiana Capital Chronicle, Dec. 1, 2025. 4

17. “REDISTRICTING DEFEATED,” The Indiana Citizen, Dec. 11, 2025; “Indiana Senate votes against new all‑Republican congressional map,” Ballotpedia News, Dec. 12, 2025. 63

18. “Indiana Republicans block Trump’s redistricting push,” ABC7 Chicago/AP, Dec. 11, 2025; “Mediaite: Indiana Senate votes against Trump‑backed plan,” Dec. 11, 2025. 915

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=20707

Don’t Be Afraid: Use the law to fight the corrupt and vicious

If you’ve lived a clean, orderly life—showed up to work, did the math, obeyed the rules, paid the bills—you learn a certain kind of strength: the strength of process. Republicans tend to be good at that kind of thing. They thrive where procedures are clear, contracts are binding, and a judge or a bookkeeper can settle disputes without theatrics. Put them in a courtroom with a well‑pled complaint? They can handle it. Put them at a negotiating table? They can handle that, too. But throw them into chaos—into the screaming, the doxxing, the crowd at a private front door—and many freeze, not because they’re cowards, but because they believe society ought to operate by rules, not by mob. That belief is noble. And it’s exactly why intimidation campaigns target them. The tactic exploits an instinct for order, and it weaponizes the fear that comes when the normal guardrails vanish. That is what we’re living through: a season where leak‑driven outrage, targeted protests at private residences, doxxing, swatting, and the constant electricity of public shaming are used to stop people from speaking, voting, and governing according to conscience.[1][2]

He’s right, he’s not very smart.

When people ask me—usually over the holidays, when social circles get wider and worlds collide—why they see guns in every room at my house, why there are pistols in the car, why I’m wary at a stoplight, I don’t answer with ideology. I answer with experience. Doxxing is not theoretical. It’s not just some internet spat. It’s real names, real addresses, real phone numbers circulating with an explicit purpose: to frighten opponents into silence.[3][4] It’s organized pressure at the home of a judge, or the spouse of an official, or the family of a journalist. And it’s sometimes followed by swatting—false emergency calls meant to trigger an armed police response—because the goal isn’t debate; it’s compliance or catastrophe.[5][6] There is a reason federal law exists that bars picketing “in or near” a judge’s residence with intent to influence a decision.[7][8][9] There is a reason Congress and the Department of Justice have repeatedly briefed on threats to Supreme Court justices since the Dobbs leak in May 2022 and on the criminal intent behind campaigns to frighten the court before a ruling is issued.[10][11] There is a reason why a man armed with a handgun, tactical knife, pepper spray, zip ties, and other gear was arrested outside Justice Kavanaugh’s home, reportedly intending to kill him over the Dobbs decision.[12] These are not hypotheticals; these are police reports and sworn filings. And if you want to understand the psychology of intimidation, look at patterns: find a leak, publish private data, escalate at the home, and hope a target simply opts out of public life.

If you ask why Republicans are particularly vulnerable to this, it’s because the tactic is engineered to exploit lawful personalities. Conservatives often draw lines around “acceptable conflict”: argue in court, vote at the legislature, publish a rebuttal in the paper. They rarely relish the street theater that Saul Alinsky framed as agitation.[13][14] Alinsky famously opened Rules for Radicals with a sly epigraph acknowledging “the very first radical … who rebelled against the establishment … Lucifer,” a provocation not as theology but as theater—a wink that lampoons establishment decorum and celebrates disruption.[15][16] It’s exactly that form of disruption—contrived conflict—that many order‑minded people find repellent or confusing. Republicans don’t “hide”; they trust the system. They don’t “cower”; they prefer the law. But the radicals who rely on intimidation know those preferences, and they know that broadcasting your address, swamping your phones, and showing up at your home on a Thursday night is not about persuasion. It’s about teaching you that rules won’t protect you, so you’d better stop talking.[17][18]

Let’s be clear about terms. Doxxing refers to publicizing personally identifiable information—home address, phone numbers, family details—often scraped from data brokers, court records, or social media, with malicious intent.[19][20] It has become a mainstream hazard. Surveys suggest roughly 4% of American adults—about 11.7 million people—have been doxxed, and more than half of adults now avoid posting political views online for fear of it.[21] Pew Research found four in ten Americans have experienced online harassment in some form, and severe harassment including threats and stalking has risen sharply; politics is the top reason people believe they were targeted.[22] Doxxing leads to real‑world harm: harassment, stalking, vandalism, job loss, and, in extreme cases, physical danger. The tactic is often paired with swatting, which weaponizes law enforcement response, creating scenarios where someone could easily be injured or killed when police arrive primed for violence at a residence over a fabricated emergency.[23][24] This is why the Department of Homeland Security published multilingual resources for individuals to mitigate doxxing risk—privacy hygiene, takedown requests, documentation, and reporting—because the hazard is not a niche edge case; it’s an everyday vulnerability in a data‑brokered world.[25][26]

If you want case studies, there are plenty. After the Dobbs draft leak in May 2022, groups publicized the home addresses of conservative Supreme Court justices and organized rolling protests outside those residences.[27][28] Virginia and Maryland governors called for enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 1507, the federal law barring demonstrations aimed at influencing judges in or near their residences, and legal scholars noted the statute is constitutional under the logic of Cox v. Louisiana and related cases distinguishing protests targeted at judicial decision‑making from general public speech.[29][30][31] House Judiciary Republicans pressed the Justice Department for briefings and enforcement, documenting home protests and bounties for real‑time location data of justices.[32] And the armed would‑be assassin at Justice Kavanaugh’s home wasn’t a myth; it was an arrest with detailed evidence of intent.[12] Regardless of partisan preference, anyone with a sense of what judicial independence requires can see the problem. You don’t need to carry a law degree to understand that “mob law is the antithesis of due process,” as the Court wrote decades ago.[30]

Consider the media ecosystem. Whether you support or oppose the content, the controversy surrounding the outing of the “Libs of TikTok” account in 2022 showcased both sides of the doxxing debate: critics accused The Washington Post of doxxing the account operator; defenders framed it as legitimate reporting on a powerful influencer.[33][34][35] The episode itself fueled online pile‑ons, family door‑knocking, Times Square billboards, and more—evidence of how identity exposure now functions as a tactic to mobilize harassment, reputational harm, and, in some cases, physical intimidation.[36][37] Move to protest reporting: conservative journalist Andy Ngo has been repeatedly targeted and physically assaulted covering protests in Portland; while one jury in 2023 found some defendants not liable, other defendants defaulted and were ordered to pay $300,000 for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the U.S. Press Freedom Tracker documented the injuries and the pattern of targeting.[38][39][40][41] You can disagree with his coverage, his framing, or his politics. That doesn’t change the reality that violence was used—and that the tactic aims not at debate but at deterrence.

Swatting is the sharper edge of this blade. In late 2023 and into 2024, swatting attacks targeted elected officials and public figures across parties—including Christmas Day incidents against Sen. Tommy Tuberville, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, and others—followed by further waves into January, with subsequent federal indictments of foreign nationals for threats and false information.[42] Reporting cataloged hundreds of cases of political violence since January 6, including threats to election workers and public officials, with a rising use of intimidation tactics and fentanyl‑laced mail to offices.[43][44] By 2025, news outlets documented a new spate of swatting directed at conservative media figures and commentators; the FBI publicly acknowledged the trend and said it was investigating.[45][46][47] Some of these accounts are partisan, some editorialized, but the common denominator is not ideology; it’s the escalation of tactics to make people fear speaking or serving. That’s the line we’re crossing repeatedly.

So back to the holiday question: why so many guns, why the defensive posture, why the wariness at a stoplight? The honest answer is that after decades confronting radical intimidation—labor agitation that spills into private threats, targeted campaigns to hurt families, road‑rage entrapments—you stop treating it as a moral fable and you start treating it as risk management. In Ohio, the law recognizes you don’t have to retreat if you’re in a place you have a right to be: Senate Bill 175, effective April 6, 2021, eliminated the duty to retreat and clarified the burden of proof, while Ohio Revised Code § 2901.05 presumes self‑defense when someone unlawfully enters your residence or vehicle.[48][49][50][51] “Stand your ground” is not a license to escalate; it’s a legal recognition that you may use proportional defensive force when you reasonably believe you face imminent serious harm, without first being required to flee.[52][53] The prosecution bears the burden to disprove self‑defense beyond a reasonable doubt when there is evidence supporting the claim.[48] The instruction is precise: don’t start the fight, don’t use unreasonable force, but don’t let a criminal threat define your fate. That’s not bravado; that’s statutory language.

For those who have not endured doxxing in the real world, it might sound dramatic to talk about every room armed, every trip armed, every stoplight scanned. But the reality is that doxxing shrinks the buffer zones people rely on for privacy and safety. If your address is repeatedly published, if strangers show up at your house to shout threats, if camera crews lurk at your driveway, if people try your door handles and peer into windows, those are not expressions of speech; they are acts of intimidation and sometimes of criminal conduct. In Ohio, if someone unlawfully enters your occupied vehicle, the law presumes your defensive force was justified; that presumption exists for a reason—to prevent victims from being second‑guessed into paralysis.[48] And while each fact pattern matters, the principle holds: defensive readiness is not mania; it’s the sober conclusion of years spent dealing with people who believe fear is a legitimate political tool.

Why does the left’s radical edge rely so heavily on tactics like doxxing? Because it collapses distance. It shortens the time from a post to a porch. It transforms speech into confrontation at scale. Alinsky’s theory was that agitation “vents hostilities,” forces institutions to accommodate demands, and conditions targets to yield when noise gets high enough.[54][13] In our digital environment, that agitation is algorithmic and archival; it can mobilize instantly and persist indefinitely. The result is that ordinary civic actors—school board members, judges, election staff, journalists, donors—face targeted campaigns in their private lives, and many are quitting. Princeton’s Bridging Divides Initiative released a dataset capturing hundreds of threats and harassment incidents targeting local officials nationwide since 2022 and found events rising year‑over‑year and dispersed across nearly every state; they warn that civic spaces are being normalized to hostility.[55] West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center reviewed federal charges from 2013–2024 and found threats to public officials nearly doubled, driven by ideologically motivated actors; preliminary 2024 data suggested new record highs.[56] The Center for Strategic and International Studies cataloged domestic terrorism plots against government targets and found a dramatic increase since 2016, including attacks against elected officials motivated by partisan grievance.[57] This isn’t hyperbole; it’s the statistical backdrop to your holiday lunch.

What does a healthy society do with that backdrop? It doesn’t tell targets to hide. It doesn’t say “stop talking and they’ll leave you alone.” It sets standards for lawful protest and enforces them. It distinguishes between petitions to government and pressure campaigns at private residences intended to influence rulings or votes. It enforces statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 1507 when the intent element is satisfied—a narrow law designed to protect the independence of the judiciary.[7][36][39] It recognizes doxxing as a form of technology‑facilitated violence, not merely “speech,” and updates state codes where necessary to criminalize malicious dissemination of personally identifiable information when paired with threats or harassment, while preserving legitimate reporting and accountability journalism.[16][19] It treats swatting as the attempted lethal use of law enforcement and imposes serious penalties—twenty years in some precedents where deaths occurred from false calls; federal investigations and international cooperation are already underway where foreign actors are involved.[24][42] And it trains citizens practically: privacy hygiene, data broker opt outs, situational awareness, contact protocols with local law enforcement, and documentation.[25][26]

Some will say that armed readiness escalates risk. The answer is that readiness isn’t escalation; misuse is. If you carry, train. If you defend, do it within the law: proportionality, imminence, no initial aggression. Study the elements and jury instructions; they exist for a reason.[50][54] Remember that the point is not to “win a fight”; it’s to preserve life and liberty in a society where intimidation is being tested as policy. The rule of law is not reinforced by retreating from public space. It’s reinforced by participating vigorously and refusing to let mobs define the boundaries of speech. When someone says, “Why not just ignore it?” the reply is: because silence is often the objective. They doxx you to make you mute. They swat you to make you fear your own home. They crowd your driveway to make you cave. Every line of statute and case law that protects private residences and recognizes self‑defense exists to keep the conversation going, not to end it.

I don’t romanticize conflict. I prefer production to protest, contracts to chants, negotiation to theatrics. But if you challenge entrenched interests—public‑sector unions, radical activist cells, political patronage networks—some will test you at the edges: at your windows, at your stoplights, at your side doors. Over time you stop taking it personally and start treating it as maintenance. You document. You report. You opt out of data brokers. You invest in lighting, cameras, and training. You meet local officers and share phone numbers. You file complaints when lines are crossed. And you stay engaged. Because in the end, intimidation tactics corrode institutions only if they work. Every time they fail, the tactic loses power. Every time someone doxxes and gets silence in return, they’ll do it again. Every time someone doxxes and gets lawful resistance and prosecutorial consequences, the tactic loses shine.

If you’re reading this as a Republican who dreads confrontation, understand that your discomfort is exactly what the tactic seeks to leverage. You don’t have to become a “street fighter” to push back; you just have to become a disciplined citizen who knows the law, asserts your rights, and refuses to concede your private space to political theater. It’s not about swagger. It’s about keeping civic life normal. Judges should not be pressured at home over pending opinions; we have codes, ethics rules, and legal processes for that.[7][31] Journalists should not be beaten for coverage even if you dislike their editorial line; press freedom norms and assault statutes exist to prevent that.[40][41] Election workers should not receive fentanyl‑laced letters or doxxed phone lists; we have criminal laws for that and should fund the protection of local offices.[44][49] And families should not be forced to choose between speech and safety. The law exists to make that a false choice. Use it.

If you still wonder why someone like me treats doxxing as an “opportunity,” it’s because intimidation reveals intent—and intent clarifies response. When someone shows up at your window with a threat, they’re making a legal mistake. When someone posts your address with a call to harass, they’re making a legal mistake. When someone calls the police with a false emergency to trigger a SWAT response, they’re making a potentially lethal legal mistake. Every one of those mistakes creates a trail, and every trail is a chance to enforce norms. That’s not vigilante justice; that’s the civic feedback loop. And if more people participated in it—opted out of fear, opted into law—the chaos would recede. That’s not naïve. It’s work. But it works.

So to the friends who ask why the car is set up the way it is, why the house looks like a training facility, why the daily routines read like checklists, the answer is that it’s easier to live joyfully when preparedness is a habit. I’d rather shoot recreationally than defensively. I’d rather build than guard. But I’d also rather be alive and free. You don’t have to love conflict to be good at living through it. You just have to refuse to let people who love chaos define the terms of your life. And if more rule‑minded citizens made that refusal loudly and lawfully, our politics would be calmer, not hotter.

In the end, Republicans aren’t “afraid” of conflict. They’re allergic to lawlessness. That’s why intimidation often works—once. And that’s why it stops working when the targets read the statutes, log the evidence, and enforce the boundary between protest and persecution. The radicals will keep trying; agitation is their model. But order is a model, too. The best answer to doxxing isn’t censorship. It’s bright legal lines, practiced citizens, and consequences for people who turn speech into menace. That’s not rhetoric. That’s the operating manual. And it’s written in a language anyone can learn.  So don’t be afraid.  Use the laws we have to ensure we have a good world to live in. 

—

Footnotes

[1] Pew Research Center, “The State of Online Harassment,” Jan. 13, 2021 (politics cited as top reason for harassment); link.[22]

[2] CSIS, “The Rising Threat of Anti-Government Domestic Terrorism,” Oct. 21, 2024; link.[57]

[3] DHS Office of Partnership and Engagement, “Resources for Individuals on the Threat of Doxing” (Infographic), Jan. 16, 2024; link.[26]

[4] Emerald Insight (Anderson & Wood), “Doxxing: A Scoping Review and Typology,” 2021; link.[16]

[5] NAAG Journal, “The Escalating Threats of Doxxing and Swatting,” Aug. 12, 2025; link.[23]

[6] Wikipedia summary of swatting against American politicians, Dec. 2023–Jan. 2024, and DOJ indictments, Aug. 2024; link.[42]

[7] 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (picketing or parading near judge’s residences); Cornell LII; link.[35]

[8] PolitiFact, “Is it legal to protest outside justices’ homes? The law suggests no,” May 13, 2022; link.[37]

[9] Reason/Volokh Conspiracy, “Federal Statute Bans Picketing Judges’ Residences,” May 6, 2022; link.[36]

[10] DOJ Office of Legislative Affairs memos referencing SCOTUS threats briefings & §1507 post‑Dobbs leak (June–Aug. 2022), link.[25]

[11] MTSU First Amendment Encyclopedia, “Picketing Outside the Homes of Judges and Justices,” Aug. 11, 2023 (notes governors’ calls for enforcement), link.[39]

[12] House Judiciary Committee GOP press release, “Judiciary Committee Raises Concerns on Safety of Supreme Court Justices,” July 23, 2024 (details Kavanaugh plot and home protests), link.[26]

[13] Chicago Magazine, “Conservatives Might Agree With Hillary Clinton’s Thesis on Saul Alinsky,” July 20, 2016; link.[4]

[14] Wikipedia, “Hillary Rodham Senior Thesis,” summary of Alinsky framing and Clinton’s critique; link.[2]

[15] PolitiFact, “What Ben Carson said about Hillary Clinton, Saul Alinsky and Lucifer,” July 20, 2016; link.[3]

[16] Skeptics StackExchange, analysis of the Lucifer epigraph vs. dedication myth (cites book text); link.[6]

[17] Heritage Foundation Commentary, “Refusing to Prosecute Those Protesting at Supreme Court Justices’ Homes Is Inexcusable,” June 1, 2022; link.[27]

[18] Syracuse Law Review, “Protests by Abortion Advocates at Justices’ Homes,” May 19, 2022; link.[28]

[19] DHS OPE Infographic defining doxing and mitigation steps; link.[32]

[20] Abuse Refuge Org, “Doxing and Privacy Violations: The Weaponization of Personal Information,” Apr. 25, 2025; link.[33]

[21] SafeHome.org, “2025 Doxxing Report,” Oct. 24, 2025 (prevalence, fear of posting politics), link.[14]

[22] Pew Research Center, “The State of Online Harassment,” Jan. 13, 2021; link.[13]

[23] NAAG Journal (Wang), “Doxxing and Swatting—Legal Responses,” Aug. 12, 2025; link.[15]

[24] Case example: Wichita swatting death; general sentencing coverage summarized in NAAG Journal; link.[15]

[25] DHS Resource Page “Resources for Individuals on the Threat of Doxing,” update listings in multiple languages, Apr. 8, 2024; link.[18]

[26] DHS OPE Infographic PDF, Jan. 16, 2024; link.[32]

[27] Fox News, “Far-left activists targeting politicians’, judges’ homes…,” May 6, 2022 (documents “Ruth Sent Us” addresses publication); link.[29]

[28] Law & Crime, “Can Protesters Be Arrested for Picketing Supreme Court Homes?” May 12, 2022; link.[38]

[29] Reason/Volokh discussion of §1507 and Cox v. Louisiana; link.[36]

[30] PolitiFact analysis of §1507 intent requirement and First Amendment balance; link.[37]

[31] MTSU First Amendment Encyclopedia overview and statute text; link.[39]

[32] House Judiciary GOP press release documenting protests and bounty offers; link.[26]

[33] AllSides explainer, “Was Libs of TikTok Doxxed by The Washington Post?” Apr. 20, 2022; link.[8]

[34] Newsweek coverage of Libs of TikTok controversy, Apr. 20–21, 2022; link.[7]

[35] Fox News coverage criticizing WaPo/Lorenz (editorial), Apr. 19, 2022; link.[10]

[36] WND/The Western Journal article on billboard response (opinion), Apr. 28, 2022; link.[11]

[37] DOJ memos acknowledging SCOTUS threats briefings post‑Dobbs leak; link.[25]

[38] Portland Mercury report on 2023 jury verdict (two defendants not liable), Aug. 9, 2023; link.[44]

[39] Newsweek, “Conservative Journalist Gets $300,000 After ‘Antifa’ Assault,” Aug. 22, 2023 (default judgments), link.[41]

[40] U.S. Press Freedom Tracker incident record (Ngo assault), updated Aug. 21, 2023; link.[45]

[41] The Post Millennial recap of civil case and counsel rhetoric (biased outlet), Aug. 8, 2023; link.[40]

[42] Wikipedia compilation, “Swatting of American politicians (2023–2024),” plus DOJ indictments of foreign nationals, Aug. 2024; link.[21]

[43] ABC News, “Election officials continue to face threats, harassment…,” July 25, 2024 (King County doxxing; fentanyl letters; Brennan Center commentary); link.[49]

[44] Wikipedia, “Political violence in the 2024 U.S. presidential election” (compilation of incidents & context), Oct. 2024; link.[50]

[45] Fox News, “FBI investigating rise in swatting incidents…,” Mar. 14, 2025; link.[24]

[46] Shooting News Weekly, “Swatting… continues across the country,” Mar. 16, 2025 (partisan framing but incident citations); link.[20]

[47] Scene in America, “The Rising Threat of Swatting… targeting conservative voices,” Mar. 17, 2025 (commentary), link.[19]

[48] Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.05 (burden of proof; castle doctrine presumption), effective Apr. 6, 2021; link.[52]

[49] Hiltner Trial Lawyers explainer on Ohio Stand Your Ground (SB 175), Mar. 5, 2025; link.[56]

[50] Ohio Jury Instructions CR 421.21 (self‑defense, deadly force, elements & burden), rev. Nov. 16, 2019 (updated context post‑statute change); link.[54]

[51] Graham Law summary, Ohio Stand Your Ground law effects and elements; link.[55]

[52] Patrick M. Farrell Co. LPA, “Ohio Self-Defense Laws Explained,” Aug. 19, 2025 (imminence; proportionality; no duty to retreat); link.[53]

[53] Green Bay Crime Reports explainer (overview of Ohio self-defense evolution; no duty to retreat), Aug. 11, 2025; link.[57]

[54] Chicago Magazine analysis of Alinsky method and agitation as tactic; link.[4]

[55] Princeton BDI Threats & Harassment Dataset launch, Apr. 11, 2024; link.[47]

[56] Combating Terrorism Center (West Point), “Rising Threats to Public Officials,” May 2024; link.[48]

[57] CSIS domestic terrorism brief, Oct. 21, 2024; link.[46]

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=20707

Dumping Biden’s Autopen Executive Orders: Destroying the silent insurrection by institutional manipulation

From a position of principled dissent, one must assert: it is both appropriate and necessary for President Trump to rescind the executive orders and other instruments signed by President Biden via autopen. This move is not a partisan slight against Biden himself—instead, it’s a justified protest against the institutional apparatus that hijacked executive authority during his presidency.

Trump’s decision signals a break with what has become a “fourth branch” of government. Bureaucrats, intelligence officials, and political operatives effectively commandeered presidential power behind the scenes, wearing its cloak while burying proper accountability. If MAGA goes silent—if it ceases to challenge the corruptive center of institutionalism—that deviation will be permanent. The people’s voice, once quieted by the elite through procedural manipulation, seldom returns.

Rooted in ancient traditions, the MAGA movement echoes the Teacher of Righteousness dissenters described in the Damascus Document of the Dead Sea Scrolls: insurgents who arise whenever authority no longer serves its constituents but rather entangles them in webs of venality. These protestations are not aberrations; they are hardwired into human nature and political life. Revolts are rhetoric, yes—but when discourse fails, and trust is broken, they become relentless, even righteous rebellion.

This moment is not historically unique. We are neither living through an aberration nor an anomaly—we are participating in a time-tested cycle of institutional decay and public backlash. Unless actively disrupted, this cycle does not correct itself. It requires decisive, uncompromising change.

Consider the COVID-19 pandemic. Beginning in 2020, it became a vehicle for global actors to consolidate control—governmental, financial, technological—and push bio-political frameworks that were as deadly as they were deceptive. Millions perished under directives engineered from the top. Those who operate these levers today are leveraging their power to set conditions for continued control—some of which may require enduring Trump another three years, or at least until 2028.

Biden did not genuinely win control—an elaborate maneuver of autopen, election doubt, and pandemic-induced panic that carried over into his administration. This isn’t about policy disagreement; it’s about the subversion of election integrity and democratic process. The Republican moderates—the power brokers in both parties—are complicit. They reap the financial rewards of insider governance even as they masquerade as safeguards of free enterprise.

The result is a system in which corporate power is maintained not by competitive markets but by governmental decree. Industry giants lobby, they legislate, and they leverage regulated advantage into an immovable monopoly. This is neither capitalism nor democracy—it is centralized privilege.

Trump was placed in office to correct this—not because of policy disagreements but due to the growing realization that the system had mutated into an oligarchy, one that served the same servile beneficiaries from Washington to Wall Street.

But removing Trump in the middle of the purging process transformed what should have been a transitional restoration into something dangerously uncertain. The institutionalists within government, sensing their loss, have regrouped. Joe Biden is not a break in continuity—he is an extension of their covert agenda.

Consider Biden’s record: 162 executive orders in four years—an aggressive use of unilateral powers and far above average relative to modern presidents12. Nearly 41% were revoked by Trump within days of resuming office. These orders spanned everything from invoking the Defense Production Act on electric vehicles and biotech34 to mandating federal minimum wage increases4, forcing climate policies4, and rerouting federal dollars into union apprenticeship programs34.

The extraordinary scale and scope of these unilateral actions—used to circumvent Congressional approval—highlight why the MAGA movement fears complacency above all else.

The autopen controversy, then, wasn’t accidental. Biden’s use of an autopen—a device that mechanically reproduces signatures—became the focal point of MAGA’s alarm. Trump asserts that some 92% of Biden’s signed actions were processed via autopen and are thus inherently invalid 56. Among those, suggestions range from presidential orders to pardons, including those granted to Fauci, General Milley, and members of the January 6 committee 78. Critics argued that such coverage without the President’s direct signature was illegitimate—even perjurious.

Legal experts, however, dismissed this view. A 2005 Department of Justice memo confirmed that autopen signatures are legally valid when authorized910. Courts have noted that presidential pardons need not be in writing at all. Scholars point out that once issued, pardons are inviolable and immune from revocation by successor administrations.

Yet that technical legality missed the moral point. MAGA supporters argue that legality without legitimacy is insufficient. Just because the bureaucratic mechanism parses it as valid doesn’t mean it bears democratic authority. The autopen represented the final straw—evidence that control had left the people’s hands and entered automated dominance.

And Trump understood that scenery. So he initiated investigations, revoked dozens of orders, and canceled more—drastically—by first-day cutbacks, then March 2025 revocations, then this sweeping de-autopenization3414.

With every revocation, MAGA restored control to the people. But letting institutional leverage settle in would have been worse. Trump resisted governing by consensus because consensus had betrayed the people. These were not minor adjustments—this was a reset intended to reassert popular mandate over administrative stealth.

But MAGA supporters rationalize: corruption must be uprooted in bulk. If parts of the system are irredeemably corrupt, small-scale reform isn’t enough. Action requires either unyielding disruption, not temporary band-aids.

Looking ahead, that disruption must be institutionalized. It cannot rely on Trump alone. Political seats must be won—governorships, Congress, school boards, city halls—to institutionalize disruption.

Look at the midterms and below: they are won not by playing nice, but by embodying the fight. MAGA must not compromise away the only movements capable of checking deep corruption at its root.

Yes, Trump governed as though working within the system would tame it. But the system used that effort to reassure itself. Civil servants nodded in his face, only to conspire behind his back.

We saw the phenomenon in COVID policies, ending that contradictory presidency. Those pushing pandemic mandates operated beyond democratic oversight—unelected experts, bureaucratic rule. It took an insurgent presidency to expose the duplicity.

Now, Trump fights back by reclaiming the instruments of executive power—by drawing lines in the sand, and by vociferously naming those who conspired in executive hollowing.

If he retreats now—if MAGA shrinks in the face of institutional backlash—the effort is for naught. As Jesus said: A house divided cannot stand.

But if MAGA rallies—if cities and states choose representatives willing to enact true reform—then Trump’s disruption becomes permanent. That means a crackdown on conspirators, a legal reckoning for the autopen cabal, and an end to post-hoc presidential puppeting by hidden staffs.

Statistically, the number of executive orders matters. Biden averaged ~40 EO’s per year1718—a pace far above average, and far above what would be sustainable if the presidency were not treated as a governing elite office. Removing the excessive orders flipped control from institutions back to voters.

Yet the statistics also warn that Biden’s focus on memoranda, including national security memoranda—a bladeshot form of autocratic bypass—became a hallmark of invisible governance. Often, a memo could usurp statutory authority or declare an emergency under concealment.

This leads to election security.

After 2020, mistrust was deep. Pew reported that only 58% of Trump voters trusted that the outcome would be clear after counting, and 92% believed the result should be known within days19. Meanwhile, nine out of ten voters overall prioritize preventing illegal voting. That’s trust based on process, not rhetoric.

But trust evaporates when systems are vulnerable. Since 2020, 92% of local election officials reported enhanced security measures in 2021. That heightened security owes to both increased systemic threats and widespread mistrust.

MAGA’s claim: if the institutions are deploying executive power without transparency—or are altering election governance through memo rather than law—they steal not merely ballots, but trust, legitimacy, and authority.  Trump’s aggressive stance on revocation isn’t mere revenge. It’s a necessary action to preserve our republic.

For that to endure, strong, secure elections are the baseline—not tokenism. If elections are hacked or adjudicated behind closed doors, the outcome is irrelevant. No amount of EO revocation matters if the mechanism behind the vote remains under covert control.

If Trump secures seat wins in the next elections—not because of compromise but through campaign-first messaging—then the movement becomes structural, not merely rhetorical.

We fought for Trump for this structural change. We didn’t give him a mandate to play nice. We gave him a mandate to fight.

So—Go hard. Rescind, revoke, prosecute. Take out the institutional rot with precision. Shut down the cabals. If you’re going to mess with systems, do it permanently. Don’t hesitate. Strike fast.

It is time to institutionalize MAGA, not depersonalize it. If regulations housed the poison, uproot them entirely. If rival offices conspired, expose them and break them. If colluding agencies diverted funds, revoke and defund them. If secretive pardons sheltered corruption, expose them to the sunlight and eliminate their immunity.

And then, pivot—once the rot is removed—to reconstruction: a government that serves the people with genuine transparency, limited-term appointments, reformed election security, and executive power that is retrievable, contestable, and transparent.

It’s not enough to protest with words. Words are hollow if the power is in the hands of the few. Remove the instruments of unilateral control, and stand them up anew in the hands of governors, legislators, and citizens.

Let Trump’s actions serve not as a cult, but as a crucible: to temper institutions to service, not mastery.

The autopen exposes the lie. Insurgency confronts the machine. If MAGA falters, they reassert it. If MAGA stands firm, the movement morphs into stewardship.

Now is the choice—not tomorrow.

Footnotes

1. U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President: Use of Autopen to Sign Enrolled Bills, July 7, 2005.

2. Congressional Research Service, “Presidential Pardons: Legal Authority and Limitations,” CRS Report RL31340, updated 2023.

3. Federal Register, “Executive Orders by President Joseph R. Biden,” 2021–2024.

4. Pew Research Center, “Public Confidence in Election Integrity,” October 2020.

5. National Association of Secretaries of State, “Election Security Measures Post-2020,” Annual Report, 2023.

6. White House Archives, “Executive Orders Revoked by President Trump,” March 2025.

7. Brennan Center for Justice, “The Autopen Controversy and Presidential Authority,” Policy Brief, 2024.

8. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Insider Trading Risks in Federal Governance,” GAO-22-104, 2022.

9. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “COVID-19 Mortality Data,” 2020–2022.

10. Congressional Budget Office, “Economic Impact of COVID-19 Policies,” 2021.

11. Department of Homeland Security, “Cybersecurity and Election Infrastructure,” 2023.

—

Bibliography

• Brennan Center for Justice. The Autopen Controversy and Presidential Authority. Policy Brief, 2024.

• Congressional Research Service. Presidential Pardons: Legal Authority and Limitations. CRS Report RL31340, updated 2023.

• Federal Register. “Executive Orders by President Joseph R. Biden.” 2021–2024.

• Pew Research Center. “Public Confidence in Election Integrity.” October 2020.

• U.S. Department of Justice. Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President: Use of Autopen to Sign Enrolled Bills. July 7, 2005.

• U.S. Government Accountability Office. Insider Trading Risks in Federal Governance. GAO-22-104, 2022.

• White House Archives. “Executive Orders Revoked by President Trump.” March 2025.

• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “COVID-19 Mortality Data.” 2020–2022.

• Congressional Budget Office. Economic Impact of COVID-19 Policies. 2021.

• Department of Homeland Security. Cybersecurity and Election Infrastructure. 2023.

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=20707

The Ohio Governor Race: Vivek Ramaswamy vs. Amy Acton—”the lockdown lady”

You know, people keep asking me about this Ohio governor race, and I’ll tell you what I think: Vivek Ramaswamy is going to win, and he’s going to win big. But that doesn’t mean you sit back and assume it’s all going to happen on autopilot. Campaigns aren’t won by assumptions; they’re won by hard work, strategy, and relentless execution. And if you’ve seen some of the chatter online—polls showing Amy Acton up by a point or two—you might think, “Wow, is Vivek in trouble?” No, he’s not. But let’s break this down because there’s a lot of smoke and mirrors in these early numbers.

First, let’s talk about Amy Acton. Who is she? Most people don’t even remember her name right now, and that’s part of the problem. She’s the former Ohio Health Director who became the face of lockdowns during COVID. Back in 2020, she was the one telling you to stay home, mask up, and cancel your life. She shut down schools, businesses, county fairs—you name it.¹ She was Ohio’s Dr. Fauci, taking cues straight from the CDC and enforcing some of the harshest restrictions in the Midwest. And it wasn’t just policy; it was the tone. She leaned into fear. She made people miserable. And when the heat got too much, she resigned in June 2020 because she refused to lift bans on county fairs.² That’s her legacy.

Now, fast forward to 2025. People have short memories, and Democrats are counting on that. They’re hoping voters see “Dr. Acton” and think “compassionate health expert” instead of “lockdown czar.” But here’s the reality: once she starts talking, once Vivek and his team start connecting her to those lockdowns, it’s game over. Ohioans haven’t forgotten the pain of 2020—they’ve just moved on. But if you remind them who caused it, they’ll move on from her real fast.

And what’s she running on? Abortion rights, reproductive freedom, and vague promises of “public health leadership.”³ That’s it. No major accomplishments since leaving office. No executive experience beyond a failed stint as health director. She’s endorsed by unions like AFSCME and UAW, and big-city mayors are lining up behind her.⁴ But endorsements don’t erase a record of failure. And in a state that leans red, with Trump back in the White House and MAGA energy surging, that’s not enough.

Now, Vivek Ramaswamy—he’s the opposite story. Entrepreneur, author, former presidential candidate. He’s smart, articulate, and aggressive. He’s raised nearly $10 million for this race, compared to Acton’s $1.4 million.⁵ He’s got Trump’s endorsement, JD Vance in his corner, and the Ohio GOP machine behind him.⁶ His platform? Bold: eliminate income and property taxes, merit pay for teachers, work requirements for Medicaid.⁷ He’s even courting unions, which is a savvy move in a state where blue-collar voters matter.⁸

So why the tight polls? Because polls lie. Or, more accurately, they mislead. Early polls oversample urban areas, lean left in methodology, and create narratives that help Democrats fundraise. RealClearPolitics has Vivek up by 6.5 points (49.5% to 43%).⁹ But Impact Research claims Acton is down by just one point, and Hart Research even shows her up by one among likely voters.¹⁰ Sounds scary, right? Until you realize these are snapshots taken before the campaign really starts. Acton hasn’t been vetted yet. She hasn’t faced Vivek on a debate stage. She hasn’t had to answer for the misery she caused during COVID. When that happens, those numbers will swing hard.

Here’s what I told people: don’t panic, but don’t get complacent. Vivek could walk out today and win by 15 points, maybe more. On Acton’s best day, she loses by eight. But campaigns aren’t about best days; they’re about execution. Vivek needs ads, billboards, ground game, and a war chest big enough to drown out the noise. And that’s why he’s smart to push fundraising now. Take nothing for granted. Because Democrats will throw everything at this race—they know Ohio is a battleground, and they’d love to embarrass Trump by flipping it blue.

And let’s not forget the Trump factor. If Trump does a couple of rallies in Ohio for Vivek, it’s lights out for Acton. He probably doesn’t even need that help, but it would seal the deal. MAGA voters will turn out in force. Independents? They’ll break for Vivek once they see Acton’s record. And suburban moms—the group Democrats are banking on—aren’t going to forget who kept their kids out of school for months. That’s political kryptonite.

So what happens when Acton starts talking? Disaster. She’s awkward, ideological, and out of touch. She was a radical during COVID, and she hasn’t changed. Democrats think they can hide that, but they can’t. The minute Vivek’s team rolls out ads showing her press conferences from 2020, it’s over. She’s the lockdown lady. The face of fear. And Ohioans aren’t voting for that in 2026.

Now, let’s talk strategy. Vivek needs to keep doing what he’s doing: stay aggressive, stay visible, and keep hammering the contrast. He’s a builder; she’s a bureaucrat. He’s about freedom; she’s about control. And he needs to remind voters that elections have consequences—because if Acton wins, Ohio goes backward. More mandates, more government overreach, more progressive nonsense. That’s the choice.

So, bottom line: Vivek wins. Easily. But only if he fights like he’s ten points down. No coasting, no assumptions. Raise the money, run the ads, knock the doors. Because politics is like football—you don’t win by reading the headlines; you win by playing the game. And when the game starts, Amy Acton is going to get crushed. She’s going to be exposed for what she is: a failed health director with no vision, no leadership, and no chance. 

And let’s not forget just how angry people were at Amy Acton during and after those lockdowns. This wasn’t mild criticism—it was rage, rage that she provoked.  People had been pushed beyond their limit, and she knew it as she did it. Protesters showed up at her home in Bexley, some carrying rifles, shouting slogans, and waving signs with anti-Semitic slurs.¹ Armed demonstrators patrolled her street while others plastered her address online.² She had to be assigned a security detail and eventually went into hiding because the threats were so severe.³ People doxed her, compared her to Nazis, and called her a “globalist” for extending stay-at-home orders.⁴ It got so bad that she resigned under pressure, citing concerns for her safety and her family’s well-being.⁵ That’s the level of backlash we’re talking about—the kind of fury that doesn’t just disappear. Ohioans haven’t forgotten that, and once voters are reminded, it will come roaring back.  And all that was just for a member of the DeWine administration.  Imagine her as the head of the Executive Branch. 

Notes on doxing actions:

1. Forward. “Ohio Protesters Gather in Front of Dr. Amy Acton’s Home.” May 2020.

2. Times of Israel. “Jewish Ohio Health Official Resigns After Anti-Semitic Backlash.” June 2020.

3. FOX 5 New York. “Public Health Officials Resign, Some Assigned Security Detail Amid Threats.” June 2020.

4. WKYC. “Why Did Dr. Amy Acton Resign as Ohio Health Director?” November 2020.

5. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “Amy Acton Faced Anti-Semitic Backlash After Lockdown Orders.” February 2021.

Bibliography

1. Cleveland.com. “Amy Acton’s Role in Ohio COVID Lockdowns.” June 2020.

2. Columbus Dispatch. “Acton Resigns Amid Controversy Over Fair Bans.” June 2020.

3. Cincinnati Enquirer. “Amy Acton Campaign Platform: Abortion Rights and Public Health.” October 2025.

4. Dayton Daily News. “Unions Back Acton for Governor.” November 2025.

5. RealClearPolitics. “Ohio Governor Race Polling Average.” December 2025.

6. Fox News. “Trump Endorses Vivek Ramaswamy for Ohio Governor.” November 2025.

7. Politico. “Ramaswamy’s Policy Agenda: Taxes, Education, Medicaid.” November 2025.

8. Wall Street Journal. “Ramaswamy Courts Unions in Ohio.” December 2025.

9. RealClearPolitics. “Ohio Governor Race Polling Average.” December 2025.

10. Impact Research and Hart Research Polls. “Ohio Governor Race Polling.” November 2025.

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=20707