Its Time for NASA to get The Right Stuff, Again: They need to work faster, longer, and launches need to happen much more often

My wife and I recently returned from a trip to NASA’s Space Coast in Florida, a place that has held a special significance in my life for over 30 years. My family has owned a condominium complex in the area for decades, and we’ve visited the Cape Canaveral region dozens of times. It’s been a big part of our lives, from family vacations to watching the ebb and flow of the aerospace industry along the coast. This latest visit was particularly exciting because I wanted to get a firsthand look at the facilities tied to the Artemis program, as well as the impressive campuses of private companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin. I am deeply invested in the expansion of human presence off-planet Earth—not just for the adventure and acquisition of knowledge, but for risk mitigation against existential threats to humanity and to unlock the full potential of human intellect beyond our world. I want a thriving space economy, and I want NASA to succeed spectacularly in leading that charge. However, my observations during this trip left me with a mix of enthusiasm and constructive criticism about the current state of NASA’s Artemis program.

We timed our visit toward the end of February 2026, hoping to catch some activity. SpaceX had a busy schedule with multiple Falcon 9 launches deploying Starlink satellites, including one on a Wednesday, another on a Friday, and a Saturday night launch around 9 p.m. that I was particularly eager to witness. These launches have become so routine and reliable that they barely make headlines anymore, which is actually a good thing—it means the infrastructure is robust, dependable, and taken for granted like buses running on schedule.¹ Yet for me, personally, it was a milestone: after all these years of visiting the area, including many stays at our family condo with views toward the launch sites, I had never personally witnessed a launch until that Saturday night. I set up my camera on the balcony, and when the Falcon 9 lifted off, it was thrilling—a bright streak lighting up the night sky, followed by the booster’s controlled descent. It felt like a long-overdue personal victory, but it also underscored a deeper issue: launches from the Space Coast should be commonplace, not rare exceptions.

In contrast, the Artemis program felt stagnant. While touring the Kennedy Space Center facilities, I noticed a heavy emphasis on historical reverence—the Apollo era, the Shuttle program, the achievements of the past. There’s immense pride in what NASA accomplished when it was the only game in town, but far less visible momentum on current endeavors. The exhibits and tours celebrate the “right stuff” mentality of old, yet the gift shop selling “The Right Stuff” merchandise feels like a relic rather than a living ethos.² When stacked against the dynamic energy at SpaceX and Blue Origin, the difference is stark.

SpaceX’s operations are behind secure gates, but their pace is undeniable. During our visit, we saw a Falcon booster that had just landed on a droneship being towed into Port Canaveral on a flatbed truck, cleaned up near restaurants where cruise ships depart, and prepared for reuse—all on a Saturday, with crews working as if it were a regular weekday.³ The company had three launches in a short window that week alone, demonstrating frequency, reusability, and high employee engagement. Blue Origin’s campus, visible right outside the visitor center gates, is enormous—once an empty field, now dominated by a massive factory complex for their New Glenn rocket and lunar lander work, rivaling or exceeding large industrial sites I’ve seen elsewhere, like GE facilities in Ohio.⁴ Their footprint signals serious investment in a new space economy.

Artemis, however, hit a snag during our stay. NASA had been preparing for an early-March launch of Artemis II, the crewed lunar flyby mission using the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and Orion spacecraft. But during final checks, including a dry run or wet dress rehearsal, issues emerged: leaks (including helium flow anomalies in the upper stage and prior hydrogen concerns) and other mechanical problems.⁵ The decision was made to scrub the March window, roll the stack back into the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) for fixes, and target April at the earliest.⁶ This delay was disappointing but not surprising given the program’s history of setbacks.

I offer this as constructive criticism because I genuinely want Artemis to work. The program represents NASA’s path to sustained lunar presence, eventual Mars exploration, and broader human expansion. But it suffers from several structural issues. First, the cadence is too slow. Apollo launches happened far more frequently, with shorter intervals that kept teams sharp, knowledge fresh, and momentum high.⁷ In Artemis, years pass between major flights—Artemis I was uncrewed in 2022, Artemis II is now pushed further, and landings are delayed. This leads to entropy: experienced personnel move on, retire, or shift careers, and institutional knowledge erodes. High turnover in skilled aerospace roles exacerbates this.

Second, there’s a cultural shift away from the bold, risk-accepting “right stuff” era.⁸ In the past, engineers and workers stayed late, worked extra shifts, and treated the mission as an adventure worth personal sacrifice. Today, NASA seems more bureaucratic—9-to-5 mindsets, emphasis on protocols (even lingering COVID-era restrictions in some views), and fear of media backlash from any failure. Catastrophic risks like Challenger and Columbia are memorialized heartbreakingly at the Atlantis exhibit, but those risks were part of pushing boundaries. Adventurers accepted it; today, there’s paralysis by analysis and PR caution.⁹

Third, workforce engagement appears lower than that of private firms. SpaceX recruits passionate people who work multiple shifts, weekends included, to meet aggressive schedules. NASA has fallen into patterns where not all hires prioritize the mission’s higher purpose—some treat it as just a job. This ties into broader criticisms of prioritizing diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) metrics over merit-based selection of the “best and brightest” for frontline problem-solving.¹⁰ While inclusion is valuable, the core must remain technical excellence and drive.

The recent program changes highlight these struggles. NASA announced major revisions: adding an interim mission (now Artemis III in 2027) for low-Earth orbit tests of docking with commercial landers (from SpaceX and Blue Origin), life support, and other systems—pushing the first lunar landing to Artemis IV in 2028, with potential for another that year.¹¹ This “sprinkling in” another mission before attempting a landing suggests the original Artemis III step was too ambitious given accumulated delays and risks, including ongoing Orion heat shield concerns from Artemis I (unexpected char loss, leading to trajectory adjustments rather than full redesign for Artemis II).¹² Changing reentry vectors might be more practical than material overhauls, which could take a decade, but it still reflects caution over boldness.

Historically, political decisions have hampered NASA. The Obama-era cancellation of Constellation, reliance on Russian Soyuz for ISS access, and redirection toward other priorities (like studying Islamic contributions to science) felt like a betrayal of the adventure spirit.¹³ The Trump administration’s creation of Space Force and push for resurgence helped, but sustained congressional support has been inconsistent.¹⁴ Without it, NASA can’t match the frequency of private players.

The local Space Coast economy reflects this. Property values have stabilized but not exploded as they could with consistent activity.¹⁵ Cocoa Beach and the surrounding areas thrive more from tourism and private launches than NASA events. When launches were rare, the vibrancy lagged; now, with SpaceX’s dominance, there’s renewed energy—people shopping at Publix, upper mobility in aerospace jobs, families coming to watch launches.

I remain optimistic. NASA has the infrastructure—Kennedy Space Center is ideal for launches—and partnerships with SpaceX, Blue Origin, and others. Administrator statements post-delay emphasized fixing issues quickly, increasing cadence (targeting more frequent SLS flights), and returning to basics to accelerate progress toward 2028 landings.¹⁶ But success requires cultural revival: robust second and third shifts, seven-day operations, passion over paycheck, acceptance of managed risk for exploration, and political unity beyond one administration.

I’ve seen the Space Coast transform, from Apollo’s glory to the Shuttle era to today’s commercial boom. My first personal launch sighting was exhilarating, but it shouldn’t have taken 30+ years. Launches should be daily occurrences—maybe grab pizza and watch one every evening. That’s the expectation we need: frequent, reliable, advancing humanity. Artemis can lead if it recaptures the right stuff—not just in a gift shop, but in every engineer, worker, and decision.

The space economy could double U.S. GDP contributions through innovation, jobs, and knowledge gains.¹⁷ It’s not just money; it’s human bandwidth expanding. Congress, local leaders, the White House—everyone must rally. Private companies are setting the pace; NASA should leverage that, not lag.  But to do all that, NASA needs to work harder and faster.  A lot faster. 

Footnotes:

¹ SpaceX Starlink launches in late February 2026 included multiple launches from Cape Canaveral.

² “The Right Stuff” refers to the 1979 book/1983 film on Mercury program bravery.

³ Reusable Falcon 9 boosters routinely recovered and refurbished.

⁴ Blue Origin’s KSC facility is massive for New Glenn production.

⁵ Helium flow anomaly in SLS upper stage led to rollback.

⁶ NASA targeted April 2026 for Artemis II post-rollback.

⁷ Apollo had a higher launch frequency in peak years.

⁸ Tom Wolfe’s “The Right Stuff” captured the early astronaut/test pilot ethos.

⁹ Analysis paralysis and PR fears cited in delays.

¹⁰ Broader debates on merit vs. DEI in technical fields.

¹¹ NASA added a mission, shifted landing to Artemis IV in 2028.

¹² Orion heat shield char loss from Artemis I prompted changes.

¹³ Obama-era program shifts and ISS reliance on Russia.

¹⁴ Space Force established in 2019 under Trump.

¹⁵ Local economy tied to aerospace activity levels.

¹⁶ Post-delay press conference emphasized speed and fixes.

¹⁷ Estimates of space economy growth potential.

Bibliography / Further Reading

•  NASA official Artemis updates: https://www.nasa.gov/artemis

•  Artemis II delay announcements (Feb 2026): NASA blogs and press releases on helium issues and rollback.

•  SpaceX launch manifests: https://www.spacex.com/launches

•  Blue Origin facilities overview: Wikipedia and company announcements on KSC campus.

•  Orion heat shield investigation: NASA technical reports post-Artemis I.

•  Historical Apollo cadence: NASA history archives.

•  “The Right Stuff” by Tom Wolfe (1979).

•  Space economy reports: Various economic analyses on growth projections.

•  Political history: Coverage of Constellation cancellation and Space Force creation.

Rich Hoffman

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The Cause of the Affordability Crisis: Managed economies and political interventions have destroyed cost structures

The truth about affordability, because that’s the tired drumbeat the Left will pound all the way into 2026: “prices are high, blame the billionaire.” It’s the same old class-war script—paint the rich guy as out of touch, pretend the pain at the pump and the grocery store fell from the sky, and hope voters forget who built the scaffolding for that pain. The truth is, affordability has roots—deep, structural roots—in policy choices that take years to unwind. Unwinding is slow; rebuilding competitive markets is slower; letting innovation breathe is slower still. But it happens. And when it happens—especially around energy and health care—you feel it first in the path of prices, then in the path of opportunity. That’s the meat and potatoes of the issue that everyone needs to understand as we go forward.

Starting with health care because it’s so grotesquely obvious—the Democrats’ favorite talking point and, paradoxically, their favorite controlled market. What the public senses as “expensive care” is really an industry whose cost structure is defended by regulation, protected monopolies, and financial engineering that prioritizes jobs and margin over cures. Just look at the macro: national health expenditures reached roughly $4.9 trillion in 2023—17.6% of GDP—and blew past $5 trillion in 2024, with CMS projecting the health share of the economy could hit 20.3% by 2033. That’s not me speculating; it’s the official actuaries. They estimate spending growth of 8.2% in 2024 and 7.1% in 2025—outpacing GDP—driven by rising utilization and coverage levels. 1234 You don’t need a PhD in economics to hear what that says: health care, as currently constituted, is set on an upward cost glide path that eats the economy.

Dig beneath the top line, and you find what patients feel: hospitals posted double-digit spending growth in 2023; physician services accelerated; prescription drugs jumped more than 11% in 2023 alone. 1 These are not isolated blips—they’re part of a financing machine that has learned to monetize chronic decline. It’s the difference between maintaining weakness for revenue and making patients truly well, which would shrink the revenue base. That philosophical choice drives both policy and practice.

Layer in the private‑equity wave. In health care, PE ownership has expanded rapidly across hospitals, specialty practices, nursing homes, and ancillaries. Systematic reviews in BMJ and updates from Wharton’s HMPI synthesize dozens of empirical studies and repeatedly find what clinicians and patients suspect: PE ownership is most consistently associated with higher costs to patients or payers and mixed-to-harmful impacts on quality. Staffing skews downward, administrative pressure increases, and the exit horizon is 3–7 years, with debt piled onto the acquired entity. 56 Even JAMA’s coverage of the evidence lands in the same place: higher costs, quality concerns. 7 Now, to be fair, not every PE hospital outcome is catastrophic; a late‑2025 research brief found no excess closures and cost-cutting concentrated in admin rather than core medicine, though patient satisfaction dipped. 8 But the through‑line is unmistakable: financialization has bridged into care delivery, and the pass-through is inflationary for payers and patients. When you lace debt service, management fees, and rapid roll-up incentives on top of already rising unit costs, affordability dies by a thousand cuts.

And we haven’t even touched the bigger affordability architecture—consolidation and financialization across supply chains. Ten years ago, lean shops squeezed costs by owning their processes and competing in open markets. Today, in many sectors—manufacturing, food processing, distribution—the playbook is add-on acquisitions, platform roll-ups, and fee-driven intermediaries. Private equity has poured roughly $262 billion into U.S. manufacturing firms since 2020, explicitly to consolidate and “unlock value at speed,” while debt financing has been layered into an already fragile logistics environment. 910 The National Economic Council’s 2021–2024 Quadrennial Supply Chain Review lays it out in sober terms: critical chains—from energy components to pharmaceuticals and agri‑food—were brittle, policy‑distorted, and subject to non-market practices that amplified shocks. 11

Why should voters care about that alphabet soup of capital and supply chain policy? Because the price on your shelf has a genealogy. COVID made that visible; economists at Brookings argue that the inflation shock was largely supply-driven, with long lags as delivery times normalized and margins reset—proving that what breaks upstream ripples downstream for years. 12 The Richmond Fed estimates that about half of a disruption’s total effect comes from amplification through the supply network; shocks abroad propagate into U.S. GDP and inflation, and re-shoring, redundancy, and inventory carry real cost. 13 Translation: if you replace diversified mom‑and‑pop networks with concentrated platforms, then hit those platforms with a once-in-a-century shock and policy friction, you get sticker shock that doesn’t vanish overnight.

Then there are the minimum wage mandates, which I warned about a decade ago when Democrats pushed for them and which, mainly, got what they wanted during Covid—the bottom-up piece of the affordability puzzle. The Left sells them as “free money,” then acts surprised when menus and price tags jump. The CPI tells a straightforward story: food away from home rose 3.6% in 2024, outpacing grocery inflation, and industry groups show menu prices still rising into late 2025. 1415 CNBC put a fine point on limited-service meals: almost 28% price growth from 2019 to 2023—well above the overall CPI—driven in part by labor cost increases that chains passed on to customers, especially in high-mandate states. 16 The academic literature fills in the mechanism. Recent meta-analysis estimates a 0.03–0.11 price elasticity to minimum wage changes—meaning a 10% hike produces roughly 0.3–1.1% price increases, bigger in labor-intensive sectors like restaurants. 17 NBER and Upjohn surveys show mixed employment effects but clear evidence of slower job growth and hours adjustments over time, with price pass-through in narrow industries. 1819 And when wage floors leap in gig delivery, the “unintended consequences” are no longer theoretical; a 2025 NBER working paper tracking Seattle’s 2024 ordinance found base pay doubled per task, but tips and order volume fell, netting out the gains for most active drivers within a month while delivery costs popped and idle time rose. 20 All that flows straight into the affordability experience at the counter. If your value meal used to be $5 and now feels like $10, it’s not imaginary—the chain is absorbing higher mandated labor costs, higher input volatility, and a consolidated middleman layer that taxes every step. The macro data confirm the sting: food prices rose 2.5% overall in 2024, but restaurant inflation was higher, and eggs, beef, and insurance were outliers. 14

The other pillar in the affordability conversation is energy—because it feeds trucks, ships, harvesters, ovens, and heat. Here’s some good news: U.S. oil production set records through 2024 and 2025, with the EIA projecting record crude and gas output in 2025, and AAA reports December 2025 gasoline averages around $2.89 nationally—the cheapest December since 2020. That’s not partisan; that’s a supply reality. 212223 The EIA’s Short‑Term Energy Outlook expects Brent to settle near $55/bbl through 2026 as inventories rise, while dry gas production continues climbing. 24 In plain English: drilling and efficiency gains—especially in the Permian—have kept domestic supply high and prices stable, muting one of the biggest drivers of household pain. 25 So when we say a pro‑production posture affects affordability, this is the line we draw: more barrels and cubic feet, fewer spikes at the pump, cheaper freight, easier input cost for food and goods.

Affordability isn’t “high versus low prices in a vacuum.” It’s the architecture of how costs stack up: energy feeds logistics; logistics feed input prices; input prices feed menus and store shelves; health care premiums drain the checking account regardless. If your cost stack is built on regulated scarcity, consolidated intermediaries, debt‑service layers, and mandated wage floors, you’ve engineered inflation. If you reverse the stack—by increasing supply (energy), rebuilding distributed ownership (manufacturing and ag), and unleashing cures (health)—you engineer disinflation. And yes, it has a lag because capital redeployments and networks re-route over quarters, not weeks.

Now, about health care’s future—the part that sounds disruptive because it is. The frontier is not the following billing code; it’s gene editing, cellular regeneration, and targeted micro‑devices that fix the plumbing without cracking open the chest. CRISPR-based therapies have already crossed the FDA threshold for specific indications, signaling that programmable biology isn’t science fiction anymore, though current price points are eye-watering and regulatory guardrails are tight. 26 Stem cell advances proceed unevenly under FDA frameworks, but the pipeline is real, and the durability of regenerative approaches changes the calculus on chronic disease costs. 27 As for “nanobots in arteries,” let’s be scientifically precise: at present, that’s experimental vision—nanotechnology for targeted delivery and plaque management is under research, but widespread, approved deployment in the U.S. is still a few years away, as in 2030. The trajectory, however, is toward minimally invasive, programmable interventions that obviate today’s expensive, labor-intensive procedures. If you strip the hype and ask, “What happens to costs if cures replace maintenance?” the answer is radical deflation in medical services that today require giant physical plants, armies of staff, and recurring billing. The only things stopping acceleration are policy acceptance and risk-tolerant frameworks that protect patients while allowing innovation to scale.

That leads to the tricky question: do we design a system that keeps people sick slowly—so the machine gets paid—or do we create a system that heals fast, and then reallocates labor to growth sectors like space, advanced manufacturing, and AI-enabled industrials? We can’t flip that switch in two months. If you liberated regenerative and gene therapies tomorrow without adjusting reimbursement and licensure, you’d displace millions of jobs and crash legacy revenue streams. But over a decade, with clear lanes for innovation and targeted transition support, you can migrate human capital to sectors that compound prosperity—what I call the “space economy” and adjacent fields—so people live longer, healthier lives and earn across extended productive spans. Morgan Stanley and others project trillion-dollar trajectories in space-enabled services, manufacturing, and communications; the point isn’t the exact number, it’s the labor shift: from managing decline to building frontiers. 28

Affordability also lives in the home. Property taxes are the most visible local lever, and they’ve been creeping up. ATTOM’s national analysis finds the average single-family property tax bill rose about 5–6% in 2024 to roughly $4,300, while effective rates ticked slightly down as home values rebounded. The press summary in early 2025 pegged average bills around $4,172 and highlighted regional variance, with Northeast/Midwest rates higher. Different methodologies, same lived experience: homeowners feel the pinch. 2930 AAA talks about gas as one side of the ledger; property taxes are the other, especially in school-heavy budgets. The Lincoln Institute’s state-by-state comparison shows effective rates are a function of reliance on property tax, home values, and spending levels, with Detroit at the high end and Honolulu at the low end for homestead effective rates. Assessment limits can shift burdens onto new buyers—a silent affordability killer. 31 Economists even argue that higher property taxes can—counterintuitively—reduce entry prices and reallocate homeownership toward younger families by capitalizing the tax burden into lower upfront costs, though that shifts pain onto older and low-income owners. 32 My point isn’t that one tax tweak fixes affordability; it’s that you can’t jack up wages, ignore supply, and raise local levies without squeezing families from three directions. If wages must rise for entry-level dignity, then energy, health, and taxes must fall—or the squeeze is intolerable. That’s arithmetic.

Ask yourself: who broke the affordability architecture? Food-at-home inflation cooled in 2024—USDA pegs it at around 1.2%—because some inputs normalized after supply shocks, yet restaurants remained pricier because labor and overhead didn’t normalize. Eggs spiked again on disease resurgence; beef rose on low cattle inventories. 33 Meanwhile, gasoline trended down year‑over‑year into late 2025; the national average sat below $3 by December. 2223 None of that aligns with the “blame the billionaire” slogan. It aligns with policy levers: energy supply, wage mandates, consolidation rules, and the health care financing model.

So when critics sneer, “What does a billionaire know about affordability?” the answer is: affordability isn’t about your bank account, it’s about whether you understand the machine. In 2017-2019, we saw what pro-production energy, plus regulatory breathing room, can do—pump prices stabilized, and freight costs fell. In 2024‑2026, EIA projections show strong domestic output and soft global prices—potential tailwinds if you don’t throttle drilling or overregulate pipelines. 2124 In the next three to five years, health innovation could begin to bend the cost curve—but only if you let it. And over the same window, you can chip away at consolidation by encouraging distributed ownership, limiting fee extraction, and restoring competitive procurement in sectors like aerospace and ag.

Agriculture is instructive. USDA reports 1.89 million farms in 2023—down slightly—with land in farms also down and acreage concentrating in high‑sales classes. In 2023, farms with $500,000+ in sales operated roughly half of all farmland—a consolidation pattern built over decades. 34 ERS’s historical work shows crop acreage shifting persistently toward larger operations; livestock consolidation has been episodic but dramatic in some lines. 3536 Production expenditures climbed to about $482 billion in 2023, with feed, labor, and services dominating the cost share. 37 That’s not a mom-and-pop landscape; it’s an industrial farm economy whose cost base moves with energy, labor, and finance. If you push mandates and taxes up while tolerating monopolized inputs, you get $6 milk and $10 burgers.

Affordability doesn’t fix itself in a quarter. It takes enthusiasm and patience—years, not months. In a MAGA-style agenda, you’d do three things at once: push energy to keep gasoline, diesel, and electricity stable; open lanes for regenerative medicine and gene therapy with reimbursement and safety frameworks that accelerate cures; and de-financialize chokepoints in supply chains by favoring private ownership, competition, and transparency over fee-stacked intermediaries. The lag effect is real. CMS projects health’s share of GDP rising, not falling, through 2033 under current assumptions; turning that curve requires more than rhetoric. 38 But you can feel affordability improve in the interim if energy and freight stay tame and food inflation stays cooled—as the 2024 numbers did. 1433

The choice at the center of health care affordability, because it’s moral as much as economic: do we maintain people’s weaknesses to preserve a sprawling, union-protected, fee-protected medical services empire, or do we make them strong again—knowing we must redeploy those workers into frontier industries? If you want the second outcome, embrace innovation and plan the transition. The space economy, industrials, AI-enabled maintenance, precision manufacturing—those aren’t sci-fi; they’re labor sinks ready to absorb talent. 28 You don’t solve affordability by berating billionaires; you solve it by designing an economy that doesn’t require families to hemorrhage cash for energy, food, and maintenance of decline.

Today’s gas is under $3 in many regions. 22 Food-at-home inflation cooled to near 1%. 33 Health spending is still climbing because we feed the maintenance machine. 1 Minimum wage hikes push menus higher, especially in limited‑service. 1617 Consolidation and financialization tax every step of the supply chain. 1110 Property taxes squeeze homeowners even as effective rates wobble with valuation cycles. 29 If you want affordability, you have to unwind the stack that made it scarce—and that takes leadership, authentic leadership that is very hard to get and takes a lot of guts to utilize.

Footnotes

1. National health expenditures and projections: CMS NHE Fact Sheet and analyses indicate $4.9T in 2023 (17.6% GDP); projected 8.2% spending growth in 2024 and continued gains through 2033 to ~20.3% of GDP. 123

2. 2023 component growth: hospital (+10.4%), physician services (+7.4%), prescription drugs (+11.4%). 1

3. PE in health care—cost and quality impacts: BMJ systematic review (2023); HMPI update (2024); JAMA coverage (2023). 567

4. PE hospitals: no excess closures; admin cost cuts; patient satisfaction decline. 8

5. Supply-driven inflation and lagged normalization: Brookings commentary (2024). 12

6. Supply chain shock amplification: Richmond Fed Economic Brief (2025). 13

7. Restaurant price dynamics: BLS CPI (2024 review); National Restaurant Association menu price notes (2025). 1415

8. Limited‑service price increases vs CPI: CNBC analysis (2019–2023). 16

9. Price pass-through elasticities from minimum wage hikes: meta-analysis (2025). 17

10. Seattle gig delivery minimum wage outcomes (2024–2025): NBER working paper coverage. 20

11. Energy production and prices: EIA STEO (Dec 2025), projections of record crude/gas; AAA national average ~$2.89 in Dec 2025; EIA weekly regional gasoline data. 24212223

12. U.S. oil production highs in 2025 (EIA/Reuters round-ups). 25

13. CRISPR therapy approvals and trajectory: FDA‑tracked approvals in 2023–2024; cost and regulation context. 26

14. Stem cell therapy/regulatory status: overviews and policy context. 27

15. Space economy outlooks and manufacturing metrics: NIST manufacturing report (2024) for macro context; industry projections. 28

16. Property tax trends: ATTOM 2024 analysis; Mortgage Professional America summary (2025); Lincoln Institute 50-state comparison; Minneapolis Fed analysis on property taxes and home prices. 29303132

17. Agriculture consolidation and expenditure trends: USDA NASS Farms and Land in Farms (2023); ERS “Three Decades of Consolidation”; AEI policy slides; NASS production expenditures (2023). 34353637

18. Food‑at‑home inflation easing in 2024; category specifics and 2025 outlook: USDA ERS Charts of Note. 33

Bibliography & Further Reading

• Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). “NHE Fact Sheet.” 1

• American Hospital Association summary of CMS projections (June 2025). 2

• Peter G. Peterson Foundation on health share of GDP. 3

• American Medical Association Policy Research Perspectives on NHE 2023. 4

• BMJ (2023). “Evaluating trends in private equity ownership…” 5

• HMPI (2024). “Update on impacts of PE ownership in health care.” 6

• JAMA (2023). “Private Equity Ownership in Health Care Linked to Higher Costs…” 7

• Cato Institute (2025). “Private Equity in the Hospital Industry.” 8

• Brookings (2024). “Lagged effects of COVID-19 supply chain disruptions.” 12

• Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (2025). “Supply Chain Resilience and Shocks.” 13

• BLS. “Consumer Price Index: 2024 in review.” 14

• National Restaurant Association. “Menu Prices,” Dec 2025. 15

• CNBC (2024). “Why fast-food price increases have surpassed overall inflation.” 16

• NBER Working Paper (2024/2025 meta & surveys). 1839

• Jorge Pérez Pérez (2025). Meta-analysis on minimum wage and prices. 17

• Reason (summarizing NBER Seattle delivery study) (2025). 20

• EIA Short‑Term Energy Outlook (Dec 2025). 24

• Offshore Technology (Mar 2025). “EIA forecasts record US crude and gas production…” 21

• AAA Fuel Prices Newsroom (Dec 2025). 40

• EIA Gasoline & Diesel Update (Dec 2025). 23

• Pipeline & Gas Journal (Aug 2025). “U.S. Oil Production Hit Record High in June.” 25

• FDA-related coverage and analyses of CRISPR therapies (2023–2024). 26

• Health journalism on stem cell regulatory landscape (2025). 27

• NIST (2024). “Annual Report on the U.S. Manufacturing Economy.” 28

• ATTOM (Apr/Jul 2025). “2024 Property Tax Analysis.” 29

• Mortgage Professional America (Apr 2025). “US property tax bill jumped again in 2024.” 30

• Lincoln Institute (Jul 2025). “50-State Property Tax Comparison Study.” 31

• Minneapolis Fed (Nov 2024). “How higher property taxes increase home affordability.” 32

• USDA NASS (Feb/Jul 2024). Farms and Land in Farms; Production Expenditures. 3437

• USDA ERS (2018). “Three Decades of Consolidation in U.S. Agriculture.” 35

• AEI (Feb 2023). “Farm Consolidation: Three Implications for Farm Policy.” 36

• USDA ERS (Jan 2025). “Retail food price inflation subsided across most categories in 2024.” 33

Rich Hoffman

Click Here to Protect Yourself with Second Call Defense https://www.secondcalldefense.org/?affiliate=20707